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DOUBLE STANDARDS: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
DISCIPLINE 
JON J. LEE* 
Abstract: Our legal system is built on the foundation that lawyers have a number 
of coexisting and sometimes conflicting duties—to their clients, to others who 
might be affected by their practice, and to the effective and equitable administra-
tion of justice. Although most lawyers fulfill these duties ethically, invariably 
some fail to live up to these expectations. For this reason, all states have created 
disciplinary authorities to regulate and sanction lawyer misconduct. Interestingly, 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is one of the few agen-
cies to have developed its own disciplinary system for policing the conduct of 
those who practice before it. The USPTO’s need to regulate the conduct of 
trademark attorneys and patent practitioners is largely due to the critical role that 
these professionals play in the provision of intellectual property rights. Yet the 
existence of this analogous disciplinary system is little more than window dress-
ing if the USPTO does not leverage its authority to ensure that those it regulates 
conform their conduct to the ethical standards of the profession. Through innova-
tive empirical methods marshalling data over sixteen years from disciplinary au-
thorities throughout the country, this Article shows that the USPTO is not only 
failing to discipline bad actors with regularity, but also overlooking the types of 
misconduct that threaten to undercut the provision of intellectual property rights 
that are in the public interest. 
INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property is often one of the most valuable—and hotly contest-
ed—assets of a corporation.1 A utility patent provides its holder with twenty 
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 1 See, e.g., Jack Nicas, Apple and Samsung End Smartphone Patent Wars, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/technology/apple-samsung-smartphone-patent.html [https://
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years of exclusive use over the patented invention, during which time the hold-
er can choose to sell the invention itself or license the right to make use of the 
invention to others for a sizeable fee.2 For example, Lipitor, the cholesterol-
lowering drug, generated approximately $130 billion for Pfizer just during the 
fourteen years it was sold under patent protection.3 Following expiration, its 
sales dipped from more than $10 billion annually to just over $2 billion4—a 
dramatic hit to be sure, but still likely allowing Pfizer to benefit from the con-
sumer recognition of its established brand.5 
Though “patent wars” may grab headlines in the popular media,6 trade-
marks arguably have even greater influence because they may exist in perpetu-
ity and are ubiquitous in their reach across industries and sectors.7 At the 141st 
Annual Meeting of the International Trademark Association in 2019, Andrei 
Iancu, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Director, touted the 
power of trademark protection in building a brand, noting that “trademark ap-
plicants have, on average, 34% higher employment and 24% greater revenue in 
the period following first filing, compared to a control group of non-filers.”8 
Indeed, a 2011 study found that Google’s trademark was worth an estimated 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/SN9N-ZPJW] (discussing the end of a seven-year legal fight between Apple and Samsung over 
smartphone technology, involving several lawsuits). 
 2 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2018) (explaining content and terms of patent rights). 
 3 Editorial, Lessons from Lipitor and the Broken Blockbuster Drug Model, 378 THE LANCET 
1976, 1976 (2011).  
 4 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PFIZER, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 26 (2018) (reporting 
annual sales of Lipitor); see Duff Wilson, Facing Generic Lipitor Rivals, Pfizer Battles to Protect Its 
Cash Cow, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/health/generic-lipitor-
sets-off-an-aggressive-push-by-pfizer.html [https://perma.cc/AW9A-QCK6] (describing Pfizer’s strat-
egy to avoid losses upon the expiration of the Lipitor patent). 
 5 See Jing Luo et al., Effect of Generic Competition on Atorvastatin Prescribing and Patients’ 
Out-of-Pocket Spending, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1317, 1318 (2016) (presenting the results of a 
study of consumer spending on Lipitor after patent expiration, suggesting that many continued to 
spend more for the brand name). 
 6 “Patent wars” refer to the contentious litigation between entities over patent rights. See, e.g., 
Nicas, supra note 1 (reporting on the legal battle over patent rights between Apple and Samsung). See 
generally THOMAS F. COTTER, PATENT WARS: HOW PATENTS IMPACT OUR DAILY LIVES (2018) 
(providing a comprehensive examination of patent laws and litigation). 
 7 ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPER-
TY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: 2016 UPDATE, at ii (2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/IPandtheUSEconomySept2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5CB-SUXD] (“Trademark-intensive 
industries are the largest in number and contribute the most employment with 23.7 million jobs in 
2014 . . . .”). 
 8 Andrei Iancu, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks by Director Iancu at International 
Trademark Association 141st Annual Meeting (May 21, 2019) [hereinafter Iancu, Remarks at Interna-
tional Trademark Association], https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-director-iancu-
international-trademark-association-141st-annual [https://perma.cc/K2R6-5CDD]. 
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$44.3 billion, just inching out Microsoft’s trademark that was estimated to be 
worth $42.8 billion.9 
But there exists an even broader perspective on the reach of intellectual 
property, one that extends beyond the immediate profit potential for those who 
hold its rights.10 Scholars long have advanced the argument that intellectual 
property rights may themselves serve as conduits to advancing public inter-
ests.11 Under this theory, patents are awarded to inventors so that inventors will 
share their inventions with others—thereby benefitting the public interest.12 
Trademarks are valuable because they provide consumers a “shortcut to find-
ing the products they desire,” while the federal registration system simultane-
ously provides protection for businesses that wish to carve out a space for 
themselves in the marketplace.13 Although this theory is not without criti-
cisms,14 the USPTO itself has repeatedly posited that all of its decisions affect 
the public interest.15 
At the same time, the implications for under-regulation of intellectual 
property rights may be far-reaching. On the heels of the catastrophic implosion 
of Theranos, the infamous health company that falsely claimed to have devel-
oped revolutionary blood tests, the media called out the USPTO for its role in 
granting Elizabeth Holmes the credibility she needed to attract investors and 
business partners through the issuance of several patents.16 Even after the de-
tails of the Theranos scam came to light, the USPTO issued the already-
defunct company five additional patents.17 On the trademark side, recently 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Sean Stonefield, The 10 Most Valuable Trademarks, FORBES (June 15, 2011), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/seanstonefield/2011/06/15/the-10-most-valuable-trademarks/#6785979236b8 [https://
perma.cc/M73Z-5GTT] (presenting the results of a brand consulting firm’s estimate of the ten most 
valuable trademarks). 
 10 Because copyright law falls under a different regulatory mechanism than the USPTO and does 
not have a disciplinary arm, it is omitted from this Article. 
 11 See Rebecca Tushnet, Intellectual Property as a Public Interest Mechanism, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 95, 96 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Justine Pila eds., 
2018); see also J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property 
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 
875, 911 (1999) (describing the conflict between private and public interest in intellectual property). 
 12 Tushnet, supra note 11, at 96. 
 13 Id. at 103. 
 14 See id. at 103–04 (identifying arguments to the contrary). 
 15 See, e.g., Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,179, 20,184 (Apr. 3, 2013) (to be codified in scattered parts of 37 C.F.R.) 
(“All decisions made by the [USPTO] in patent and trademark matters affect the public interest.”). 
 16 Daniel Nazer, Opinion, Theranos: How a Broken Patent System Sustained Its Decade-Long 
Deception, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 4, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/03/theranos-how-
a-broken-patent-system-sustained-its-decade-long-deception/ [https://perma.cc/W95Q-R2Y8]. 
 17 See Elizabeth Holmes’ Failed Theranos Was Just Granted 5 New Patents in 2019, CB IN-
SIGHTS (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/theranos-patents-2019/ [https://perma.
cc/QA9Z-5NLK] (describing five patents issued after the company shut down). 
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there has been a dramatic increase in the number of reported fraudulent trade-
mark applications from China, a country from which one-ninth of U.S. trade-
mark applications originate.18 Addressing this phenomenon, Director Iancu 
noted that without an accurate register, businesses cannot reliably use the reg-
ister to determine whether marks would be available for protection. This uncer-
tainty could in turn lead businesses to alter their strategies and increase costs.19 
The USPTO is the federal agency charged with ensuring the accurate is-
suance of U.S. patents and the federal registration of trademarks. In many 
ways, the patent and trademark functions at the USPTO are entirely separate—
each has its own office that is responsible for examining applications, and each 
has a separate board that hears appeals and other challenges.20 That distinction 
is not surprising, however, given the significant differences between the two 
species of intellectual property in terms of the relevant legal doctrines, proce-
dural requirements, and subject matter expertise involved.21 But when it comes 
to the regulation of practitioners who are authorized to practice before the 
USPTO, both fall under the purview of the USPTO’s Office of Enrollment and 
Discipline (OED), which is part of the Office of General Counsel.22 
It is this latter commonality that presents an opportunity to examine the 
current state of professional discipline across patent and trademark practice, 
along with a potential mechanism for comprehensive reform. On account of 
the technical and legal expertise required in order to successively navigate the 
respective application processes, patent and trademark applicants alike routine-
ly rely on specialized practitioners to prosecute their applications.23 All practi-
tioners—whether patent agents, patent attorneys, or trademark attorneys—are 
subject to identical USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct (USPTO Rules) that 
require them to conform their practices to the ethical standards contained 
therein.24 Even though there are some differences between the OED and other 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Jacob Gershman, Flood of Trademark Applications from China Alarms U.S. Officials, 
WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/flood-of-trademark-applications-fromchina
alarms-u-s-officials-1525521600 [https://perma.cc/3PSP-5XSY] (exemplifying the recent media atten-
tion on fraudulent trademark applications). 
 19 Iancu, Remarks at International Trademark Association, supra note 8. 
 20 See Organizational Offices, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/about-
us/organizational-offices [https://perma.cc/TZB3-84YR] (describing the organizational structure of the 
USPTO). 
 21 See discussion infra Part I. 
 22 See Office of the General Counsel, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.
gov/about-us/organizational-offices/office-general-counsel [https://perma.cc/A6MX-VS5F] (stating 
OED’s role as overseeing the “registration and regulation of patent attorneys and agents to practice 
before the USPTO”). 
 23 See discussion infra Parts II.A and II.B. 
 24 37 C.F.R. § 11.19 (2019). 
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disciplinary authorities,25 the USPTO’s disciplinary process is styled after the 
ABA Model Rules for Disciplinary Enforcement26 and its rules are largely 
modeled after the ABA Model Rules for Professional Conduct (ABA Rules).27 
So, the question arises: how does the OED compare to other state disci-
plinary authorities in its imposition of discipline on patent and trademark prac-
titioners, given the unique functions of the USPTO and its corresponding con-
cerns for those who practice before it? Surprisingly, there have been no in-
depth longitudinal empirical studies of professional discipline in the scholarly 
literature—much less any that have touched on USPTO discipline. This Article 
begins to fill that gap. It provides a comprehensive analysis of USPTO disci-
pline spanning sixteen years (2003–2018) and crossing two sets of ethics 
codes, examines the disparities between patent and trademark discipline, and 
identifies the types of misconduct that are being regulated—or missed—by 
USPTO authorities. It then explicitly links these findings to the purposes of 
professional discipline and concludes with recommendations so that the 
USPTO can realign its disciplinary work in accordance with its private and 
public constituencies. 
Part I describes the patent and trademark application processes, focusing 
on the duty of candor and the roles of the practitioner in maximizing the likeli-
hood of success.28 Although theoretically litigants can navigate both systems 
pro se, the systems are designed for those who have the requisite subject mat-
ter and legal expertise.29 Indeed, the duty of candor requires the person filing 
the application to understand what information must be disclosed to the 
USPTO and how to respond to the inevitable USPTO inquiries and objections. 
Part II outlines the regulation of USPTO practitioners, both with respect 
to the requirements for admission and disciplinary investigations.30 Although 
patent practitioners need not be licensed attorneys, all must satisfy a similar set 
of criteria to ensure they have the requisite competence and moral character 
associated with a person who is entrusted to be both a legal representative and 
a fiduciary. With the exception of reciprocal discipline, which merits special 
attention for USPTO practitioners, the USPTO’s disciplinary process bears 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 26 Compare 37 C.F.R. § 11.24 (outlining the OED’s process for imposing reciprocal discipline), 
with MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (providing for 
reciprocal discipline). 
 27 See discussion infra Part III.B (comparing and contrasting the USPTO Rules and ABA Rules). 
 28 See discussion infra Part I. 
 29 See Pro Se Assistance Program, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/
patents-getting-started/using-legal-services/pro-se-assistance-program [https://perma.cc/Y5SC-JEGG] 
(explaining that individuals can file pro se but recommending the use of a registered attorney or 
agent). 
 30 See discussion infra Part II. 
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resemblance to that of a state disciplinary authority in terms of the course of 
the proceedings and the possible sanctions that may be imposed. 
Part III introduces the two sets of USPTO ethics codes in force at various 
points during the time period under examination.31 Although the USPTO Code 
of Professional Responsibility (1985–2013) was loosely modeled after the 
ABA Code of Professional Conduct, it also contained a number of specific 
provisions that were exclusive to USPTO practice. On the other hand, the 
USPTO Rules, adopted in 2013, largely mirror the ABA Rules. The differences 
between USPTO Rules and ABA Rules highlight the ways in which the 
USPTO purports to take candor seriously. The USPTO’s stance is arguably 
accounted for by its view that its decisions have an impact that extends beyond 
the immediate applicant, to competitors and ultimately to the public at large. 
This Part concludes with the first mapping between the various sets of ethics 
codes in order to facilitate a comprehensive analysis. 
Part IV provides a theoretical framework for understanding practitioner 
discipline in the intellectual property context.32 Drawing on the work of sever-
al prominent ethics scholars,33 this Part explores the primary purposes of prac-
titioner discipline and the role of sanctions in carrying out those purposes. It 
then focuses on the role of the USPTO as the regulator of the provision of val-
uable intellectual property rights, in order to further understand and prioritize 
among the various purposes that have been identified. 
Part V presents the findings of a groundbreaking empirical study of all 
public discipline imposed by the USPTO between January 1, 2003, and De-
cember 31, 2018.34 After describing the methodology used to compile the data, 
this Part focuses on the frequency and types of USPTO-imposed discipline, in 
comparison to its state disciplinary authority counterparts. It finds that the 
USPTO disciplinary rates, though increasing slightly over the sixteen-year pe-
riod under study, lag far behind state disciplinary authorities. This Part then 
delves more deeply into patent and trademark practitioner discipline, finding 
that there are vast discrepancies between the two. Although it appears that the 
imposition of both patent and trademark discipline is primarily limited to the 
types of misconduct that are easily identified and ultimately have less impact 
on the public interest, patent practitioners are disciplined more frequently, 
more severely, and more publicly than their trademark counterparts. This Part 
also identifies and describes four commonly observed patterns of misconduct 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See discussion infra Part III. 
 32 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 33 See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
675 (2003) (presenting various theories on the purposes of lawyer discipline and the impact of adopt-
ing such theories on various constituents). 
 34 See discussion infra Part V. 
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that trigger discipline across commonly cited and highly correlated ethics 
rules. 
Finally, Part VI sets forth three recommendations for future legal and pro-
cedural reforms to improve the effectiveness of USPTO discipline in fulfilling its 
role.35 These recommendations include developing a trademark practitioner reg-
istration process to facilitate the monitoring of their work and communications; 
instituting a strategic practitioner audit program that includes extensive examiner 
input; and broadening the dissemination of information on USPTO discipline 
and expectations of its practitioners. Part VI concludes and offers thoughts on 
additional ways in which this empirical work can be leveraged and implemented. 
I. PATENT AND TRADEMARK PROSECUTION 
It is not easy to navigate the required steps to obtain a patent or register a 
trademark (collectively referred to as “prosecution”). Even if an application con-
tains the required components, there are still many legal and procedural hurdles 
awaiting the unsuspecting inventor or brand manager.36 It is for that reason and 
others that the majority of applicants choose to leverage the expertise of a patent 
or trademark practitioner—which increases the likelihood that they will success-
fully receive federal protection of their intellectual property. This Part identifies 
the primary hurdles and describes the duty of candor that runs throughout all 
interactions with the USPTO during the application process and beyond. 
A. Patent Application Process 
To be granted a patent, which gives the patent holder the right to exclude 
others from practicing a patented invention, the patent claims must adequately 
notify the public of the invention’s scope.37 The patent statute requires that the 
invention consist of eligible subject matter38 that is sufficiently disclosed in the 
patent application.39 Additionally, the invention must be novel (i.e. not previ-
ously known or used by others),40 useful, and non-obvious to one who is 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See discussion infra Part VI. 
 36 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 37 Cf. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(holding patent disclosing a process to make polyethylene terephthalate (PET) yarn, used as rein-
forcement for automobile tires, was indefinite and thus invalid). 
 38 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
 39 See id. § 112(a)–(b) (describing the requirements for the specification of a patentable inven-
tion). 
 40 See id. § 102(a)(1) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the claimed invention was 
patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the 
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skilled in the relevant field.41 If these criteria are met, a patent may be awarded 
to the applicant as long as other administrative requirements are satisfied. 
Patent applications may be filed by mail or, more commonly, online.42 
The application must include a written description and the claim(s) that de-
scribe the scope of the protection that will be afforded by the patent.43 In addi-
tion, the application must include the inventor’s name along with an oath or 
declaration that the inventor believes that he or she is the original inventor or 
joint inventor of a claimed invention contained in the application.44 Although 
not required at the time the application is filed, an Information Disclosure 
Statement (IDS) must be submitted by the applicant in a timely fashion.45 The 
IDS must contain information about all known prior art, i.e. information that 
suggests that the invention may not be original, and other information that is 
material in determining patentability.46 Further discussion of this obligation, 
known as the duty of disclosure, will follow in the next Section. 
The filing of the application is only the beginning of a lengthy and in-
volved patent prosecution process. Once submitted to the USPTO, the applica-
tion will be assigned to a patent examiner based on the technical field of the 
patent.47 The examiner will evaluate the application and issue one or more of-
fice actions containing grounds of objection or rejection.48 An applicant must 
                                                                                                                           
public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .”). This section contains several 
exceptions that are not relevant to this Article. See id. § 102(b). 
 41 Id. § 103. The statute notes: 
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the 
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole 
would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. 
Id. 
 42 See File Online, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-
application-process/file-online [https://perma.cc/G3PE-XCS3] (explaining the types of online filing 
through EFS-Web, an electronic filing system, and postal mail). 
 43 35 U.S.C. § 111. 
 44 Id. § 115. 
 45 37 C.F.R. § 1.97 (2019). The filing of the IDS has been a bottleneck for patent pendency, which 
has spurred the USPTO to develop programs to expedite the process. See Quick Path Information Disclo-
sure Statement, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/quick-
path-information-disclosure-statement-qpids [https://perma.cc/B5UP-FDFF] (describing the Quick 
Path Information Disclosure Statement). 
 46 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.97–.98. 
 47 See Stephen Key, A Former Patent Examiner Pulls Back the Curtain at the USPTO, INC. (Dec. 
11, 2015), https://www.inc.com/stephen-key/a-former-patent-examiner-pulls-back-the-curtain-at-the-
uspto.html [https://perma.cc/5CRX-DPRD] (providing an interview with a former USPTO examiner 
about his work). 
 48 Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Abandonment and Revival of U.S. Patent Application, NAT’L L. 
REV. (Oct. 27, 2012), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/abandonment-and-revival-us-patent-
application [https://perma.cc/RS9K-65PR]. 
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submit an acceptable, timely response or else the application will be deemed 
abandoned.49 An abandoned patent application can only be reinstated in limited 
circumstances; otherwise, the applicant may lose all claims to the now-
disclosed invention.50 
Once a patent is granted, the holder receives exclusive rights to the dis-
closed invention for twenty years from the date of filing provided that mainte-
nance fees are paid during the active patent life.51 If maintenance fees are not 
paid by the stated deadline, the granted patent will be deemed abandoned.52 
Again, just as in the prosecution process, this determination is typically fatal to 
the patent, and the patent holder’s rights to the disclosed invention will most 
likely be lost.53 
A patent practitioner is key to successfully navigating the patent prosecu-
tion process and thereby protecting the value of an applicant’s invention. Pa-
tent applications not only must conform to the formal requirements and ade-
quately disclose the invention with properly constructed claims, but there must 
also be persuasive responses to an examiner’s findings of obviousness or lack 
of novelty to avoid the final rejection of the application.54 Although there are a 
number of online resources that explain the process, these resources may pro-
vide a false sense of ability to navigate the process, proving to be a trap for one 
who is inexperienced in patent prosecution because the process in fact requires 
significant expertise.55 
The USPTO puts it best in its strong recommendation of securing patent 
representation: “Inventors may prepare their own applications and file them in 
the USPTO and conduct the proceedings themselves, but unless they are famil-
                                                                                                                           
 49 37 C.F.R. § 1.134–.135. 
 50 Id. § 1.137; see Abandoned Applications, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.
uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/abandoned-applications [https://perma.cc/95ZM-Y67T] 
(describing abandonment and the revival process). Note that if the abandonment occurs before the 
USPTO publishes the pending application (generally eighteen months after filing), the invention may 
remain a trade secret. See 35 U.S.C. § 122. 
 51 See Maintain Your Patent, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/
patents-maintaining-patent/maintain-your-patent [https://perma.cc/8543-AGVM] (providing details on 
maintenance fees). 
 52 See id. (“Maintenance fees are required to keep in force all utility and reissue utility patents 
. . . .”). 
 53 See id. 
 54 See Katrina Brundage & Sarah Garber, Are Patent Attorneys Worth Their Billables?, ABOVE 
THE LAW (Apr. 27, 2016), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/04/are-patent-attorneys-worth-their-billables/ 
[https://perma.cc/JSA8-6FM5] (arguing that patent attorneys are, indeed, worth their fees). 
 55 See How to Conduct a U.S. Patent Search: A Step-by-Step Strategy, U.S. PATENT & TRADE-
MARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/video/cbt/ptrcsearching (providing a guide to conducting a 
patent search). The USPTO also has a Pro Se Assistance Program. See Pro Se Assistance Program, 
supra note 29 (providing some assistance to pro se applicants but recommending the use of registered 
patent practitioners). 
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iar with these matters or study them in detail, they may get into considerable 
difficulty.”56 It further warns that, even if a pro se applicant were to be success-
ful, there is no guarantee that the patent obtained would actually cover the in-
vention the applicant intended it to.57 
The USPTO’s stance on practitioner representation is in line with the 
available data on the subject. One frequently cited58 empirical study examining 
applications filed by pro se inventors versus their practitioner counterparts re-
ported that 76% of pro se applications became abandoned, in comparison to 
only 35% of practitioner-represented applications.59 Among those that were 
successful in obtaining patents, the pro se claims were narrower—and thereby 
less valuable—than those claims that had practitioner representation. The re-
searcher hypothesized that the observed differences were due to the typical pro 
se applicant’s lack of understanding of the formal filing requirements or the 
need for timely responses, as well as the apparent lack of desire to engage in a 
lengthy exchange with examiners.60 
Perhaps surprisingly, there is no precise way, based on the publicly availa-
ble data, to determine the percentage of all patent applications that are filed with 
practitioner assistance.61 The USPTO, for its part, simply states that “most” in-
ventors do so.62 One scholar, who thoroughly examined a large sample of pa-
tent applications from 2011, found that approximately 92% were represented 
by a patent practitioner.63 To check the accuracy of the 92% estimate, this 
study examined a complete patent application dataset from 2000 to 2018,64 
                                                                                                                           
 56 General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.
uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents#heading-9 [https://perma.
cc/u4ct-33c3]. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See, e.g., Deborah R. Gerhardt & Jon P. McClanahan, Do Trademark Lawyers Matter?, 16 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 583, 591 & n.50 (2013); Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Agenda for U.S. Pa-
tent Law, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 321, 365 (2017). 
 59 Kate S. Gaudry, The Lone Inventor: Low Success Rates and Common Errors Associated with 
Pro-Se Patent Applications, 7 PLOS ONE e33141 (2012), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?
id=10.1371/journal.pone.0033141&type=printable [https://perma.cc/6X8M-XKB4]. 
 60 See id. 
 61 The publicly available data on attorney docket number and customer number do not exactly 
track the frequency of practitioner filings. See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 62 General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 56. 
 63 See Dennis Crouch, Estimate: Fewer Than 26,000 Active US Patent Attorneys & Agents, PA-
TENTLY-O (Jan. 13, 2012), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/01/the-uspto-records-identify-more-
than-41750-active-registered-practitioners-that-number-is-obviously-wrong-because-many-folk.html 
[https://perma.cc/6QBC-V8HP]. 
 64 See Patent Examination Research Dataset, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://bulk
data.uspto.gov/data/patent/pair/economics/2017/ [https://perma.cc/3VKK-HZ2G] (containing data on 
all application filings). The USPTO has made much of its data available for researchers through the 
Bulk Data Storage System and is a fruitful source for future research. See generally Bulk Data Storage 
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focusing on the attorney docket number and customer number fields.65 The 
attorney docket number is a self-selected designation that patent prosecutors 
(most likely, practitioners) may use to track their applications.66 The customer 
number is another tracking mechanism, but it is issued by the USPTO and re-
quires the prosecutor to take the additional step of completing a form.67 Over 
this time period, 96% of the applications contained an attorney docket number, 
whereas 87% included a customer number. These two values lend support to 
the 92% statistic, which will be used in Part V of this Article to estimate the 
percentage of applications that are filed by a patent practitioner. 
B. Candor in Patent Prosecution 
One of the most important roles of patent practitioners is to ensure that 
proper disclosures are made to the USPTO during the application process, or 
else they risk having the patent refused or later invalidated.68 Under 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.56, “[e]ach individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent 
application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, 
which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that 
individual to be material to patentability . . . .”69 Patent practitioners are in-
cluded among those individuals to which this duty applies.70 The duty of dis-
closure rests on the principle that a patent “is affected [by the] public interest” 
and that “[t]he public interest is best served” when the USPTO knows all of the 
information material to patentability, including information that undercuts the 
applicant’s claim.71 
                                                                                                                           
System (BDSS) Version 1.1.0, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://bulkdata.uspto.gov/ 
[https://perma.cc/F64Z-RLTS]. 
 65 See Crouch, supra note 63. 
 66 See Docket Number, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/ebc/portal/info
docketnumber.htm [https://perma.cc/S955-76T2] (defining and explaining the term “Docket Number”). 
 67 See Getting Started—New Users, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/
patents-application-process/applying-online/getting-started-new-users [https://perma.cc/EBD6-NPCV] 
(explaining customer numbers and providing an application form to obtain a customer number from the 
USPTO). 
 68 See, e.g., Lisa A. Dolak, Patent Office Contested Proceedings and the Duty of Candor, 22 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3 (2014) (noting the USPTO rule that “imposes an obligation of candor and good 
faith”); Dorian Ojemen, Comment, The Ethics of Inter Partes Review Before the USPTO, 47 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 645, 669 (2016) (explaining the importance of the duty of candor and good faith and 
comparing Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and ABA Model Rule 3.1 and 3.3); Robert 
Kalinsky, The Enhanced Duty of Candor Before the Patent Office, LAW360 (Apr. 24, 2013), https://
www.law360.com/articles/432273/the-enhanced-duty-of-candor-before-the-patent-office [https://
perma.cc/96FD-ZRSF] (“All patent applicants know of the duty of candor that is required to practice 
before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.”). 
 69 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2019). 
 70 Id.§ 1.56(c)(2). 
 71 Id. § 1.56(a). 
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This duty of disclosure is enforced in two ways. First, as described in Part 
III, the USPTO Rules mandate compliance with the duty of disclosure and sub-
ject non-compliant practitioners to discipline.72 Second, and arguably even more 
dramatic, patents in which there has been a violation of the duty of disclosure 
may be rendered unenforceable through application of the inequitable conduct 
doctrine.73 Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2011, in 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., somewhat circumscribed the scope 
of the inequitable conduct doctrine,74 it still retains vitality today.75 
In order to show inequitable conduct, a challenger must demonstrate both 
that the “applicant misrepresented or omitted material information with the 
specific intent to deceive the PTO,”76 and that the USPTO would not have “al-
lowed the claim if it had been aware of the undisclosed reference,” applying a 
“but-for” standard for materiality of the non-disclosure.77 The materiality 
prong may also be satisfied, however, where there has been “egregious mis-
conduct,” such as the filing of a clearly false affidavit.78 Furthermore, the Fed-
eral Circuit has recently expanded its view of how intent may be shown, allow-
ing an inference of intent based on “a pattern of lack of candor” such as re-
peated factual representations that turn out to be contrary to information in the 
declarant’s possession.79 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See discussion infra Part III. 
 73 See, e.g., Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 716 F. Supp. 316, 327–33 (N.D. Ill. 
1989) (finding inequitable conduct in the prosecution of one claim that resulted in the rejection of 
related patent applications). See generally Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s 
Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 735 (2011) (providing a comprehensive discussion of 
the inequitable conduct doctrine). 
 74 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). There have been several articles on the impact 
of Therasense, Inc. on findings of inequitable conduct. See generally Robert D. Swanson, Comment, 
The Exergen and Therasense Effects, 66 STAN. L. REV. 695 (2014) (adding data to the debate over 
Therasense, Inc.). 
 75 See, e.g., Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirm-
ing the lower court finding of inequitable conduct on the part of Regeneron that rendered its patent 
unenforceable). 
 76 Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1287. 
 77 Id. at 1291; see Amy Semet, Specialized Trial Courts in Patent Litigation: A Review of the 
Patent Pilot Program’s Impact on Appellate Reversal Rates at the Five-Year Mark, 60 B.C. L. REV. 
519, 524 (2019) (noting that inequitable conduct arises and a patent is found unenforceable when the 
patent prosecutor commits fraud in the patent prosecution process). 
 78 Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1292. 
 79 Regeneron Pharm., Inc., 864 F.3d at 1351 (citing Apotex Inc. v. UCB, Inc., 763 F.3d 1354, 
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); see Alison McGreary & Ryan Cagle, Federal Circuit Says Inequitable Con-
duct Can Be Inferred from Activities in a Later Patent Litigation?, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/10/13/federal-circuit-inequitable-conduct-inferred-later-patent-
litigation/id=88978/ [https://perma.cc/9HJH-VSK5] (discussing the Regeneron Pharm., Inc. decision 
and opining whether OED discipline might follow for the patent prosecutor). 
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In addition to the duty of candor in patent prosecution, there are also obli-
gations of candor and good faith in post-grant proceedings, similar to those 
codified in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.80 In 2016, these 
provisions were amended to add that filings must comply with 37 C.F.R. 
§ 11.18(b) that requires that the declarant certify the truth of all statements that 
are made within his or her own knowledge. The regulation further requires the 
declarant to certify, to the best of her knowledge, that there is evidentiary sup-
port, and that there is a bona fide legal basis for her arguments.81 
At the time of these amendments, some were concerned that the addition-
al certifications went beyond those in the patent prosecution process and would 
lead to additional disciplinary proceedings against practitioners.82 In its re-
sponse, the USPTO noted that there had not been many investigations prior to 
the amendment and that it “d[id] not expect this situation to occur.”83 Never-
theless, 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(d) explicitly provides that a practitioner who vio-
lates § 11.18 may face disciplinary action.84 
C. Trademark Application Process 
A trademark may be registered either in a particular state or nationally 
through the USPTO. Although federal registration is not required to enforce a 
trademark through an infringement action—and indeed, trademarks may be 
enforced without being registered at all—federal registration has several stra-
tegic advantages. First, it constitutes prima facie evidence that the mark is val-
id and owned by the registrant.85 Second, it allows a registrant to secure na-
tionwide exclusive rights rather than just in those geographic locations where 
the mark is currently used.86 Third, it puts all others on notice of the regis-
                                                                                                                           
 80 37 C.F.R. § 42.11 (2019); Dolak, supra note 68, at 3. 
 81 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b). 
 82 Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81 
Fed. Reg. 18,750, 18,760 (Apr. 1, 2016) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42) (providing comments on 
proposed changes prior to adoption); David Hricik, Revision to IPR Duty of Candor: Broadening 
Duty?, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 1, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/hricik/2016/04/proposed-revision-broadening.
html [https://perma.cc/U8WR-DSJG]. 
 83 Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81 
Fed. Reg. at 18,760. 
 84 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(d). 
 85 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2018). 
 86 Compare Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365, 369 (2d Cir. 1959) 
(denying injunctive relief after finding no likelihood of confusion but clarifying that “the plaintiff may 
later, upon a proper showing of an intent to use the mark at the retail level in defendant’s market area, 
be entitled to enjoin defendant’s use of the mark”), with United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 
248 U.S. 90, 101, 104 (1918) (estopping the plaintiff from seeking an injunction to prevent the de-
fendant from continuing to use a similar mark in a geographic location where the plaintiff had no 
business). 
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trant’s claim of ownership of the mark.87 Trademark applications and registra-
tions may be searched online through the USPTO website,88 and the existence 
of a registered mark can serve as an effective deterrent to organizations search-
ing to create a distinctive brand.89 
In comparison to patent prosecution, obtaining a federal registration ap-
pears to be a simple process. The application forms are available online and are 
expected to take less than an hour to complete.90 The application requests in-
formation on the owner of the proposed mark, identification of the goods or 
services the applicant uses or intends to use in connection with the mark, the 
date on which the mark was first used in interstate commerce, and whether an 
attorney is filing the application.91 A specimen illustrating the mark as used 
must also be submitted prior to registration, either with the application (if 
claiming that it is currently being used in commerce) or after publication (if 
claiming an intent to use the mark in commerce).92 
After a trademark application is submitted, there are two barriers to regis-
tration. First, the USPTO will assign an examining attorney to review the ap-
plication and potentially refuse registration.93 The most common grounds for 
refusal are likelihood of confusion (that consumers may confuse the proposed 
mark with another business)94 and descriptiveness (that consumers do not view 
the symbol as a distinctive mark).95 If the examining attorney finds a defect in 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (“[T]he filing of the application to register such mark shall constitute 
constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect, on or in connection 
with the goods or services specified in the registration . . . .”). 
 88 Search Trademark Database, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/trade
marks-application-process/search-trademark-database [https://perma.cc/4WC4-RSD4]; see TESS TIPS, 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/search/Tess_tips.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/BKD9-47X8] (explaining how to use the Trademark Electronic Search System 
(TESS) to determine whether a proposed mark could be subject to refusal due to the existence of a 
prior application or registration). 
 89 Gerhardt & McClanahan, supra note 58, at 587. 
 90 See Apply Online, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/teas/
index.jsp [https://perma.cc/GQJ2-95KS]. 
 91 15 U.S.C. § 1051. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., The USPTO Trademark Case Files Dataset: Descriptions, Les-
sons, and Insights, 22 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 669, 677 (2013) (describing and examining 
several aspects of the trademark application data). 
 94 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (providing that a mark may not be registered if it “so resembles a 
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the 
United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the 
goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive”). 
 95 See id. § 1052(e)–(f) (providing that a mark may not be registered if the mark “when used on or 
in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive” or “is primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive of [the applicant’s goods]” unless the mark “has become distinctive of the 
applicant’s goods in commerce”). 
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the trademark application or otherwise believes that it may not be suitable for 
registration, the examiner may issue an office action identifying the problem.96 
In response, the applicant—or more often, the attorney on behalf of the appli-
cant—may amend the application to fix the defect or submit additional materi-
als to demonstrate that it should register. If the examining attorney approves 
the application, the mark is published in the Official Gazette, a USPTO weekly 
publication.97 
After publication, third-parties who believe they have legal grounds to 
oppose the registration have thirty days to prevent the impending registration by 
filing an opposition proceeding.98 If no opposition is filed, or if there is an oppo-
sition and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) sides with the appli-
cant, the application will proceed to the next step in the process. Marks already 
being used in commerce will be placed on the Principal Register immediately, 
whereas those filed on an intent to use basis will register once the applicant pro-
vides evidence that he or she has begun using the mark in commerce.99 
Although the trademark registration process may be accomplished with-
out legal counsel, over three-quarters of all applications are prosecuted by at-
torneys.100 Moreover, having a trademark attorney is correlated with higher 
rates of publication and registration success. A comprehensive empirical study 
on trademark applications found that trademark applicants were 37% more 
likely to succeed in publication and 43% more likely to succeed in registration 
than their pro se counterparts.101 Among trademark attorneys, experience pros-
ecuting trademark applications was correlated with even higher success rates—
a significant finding given that those attorneys likely take on more challenging 
cases.102 
There are a number of reasons posited for the higher trademark attorney 
success rates. First, attorneys have a greater understanding of the underlying 
trademark doctrine and can draft responses to avoid legal landmines.103 Sec-
ond, they may be less conflict-averse than their pro se counterparts, choosing 
to respond to an examining attorney’s objection rather than abandoning the 
application at the first sign of trouble.104 Third, their higher success rates might 
reflect selectivity in which applications to prosecute, as they may be counsel-
                                                                                                                           
 96 Trademark Process, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/
process/ [https://perma.cc/M5PF-ME29]. 
 97 Id. 
 98 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a). 
 99 Id. § 1051. 
 100 See Gerhardt & McClanahan, supra note 58, at 600. 
 101 Id. at 607–08. 
 102 Id. at 611, 617. 
 103 Id. at 597, 617. 
 104 See id. at 617–18. 
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ing their clients at the outset that they will be unable to register a descriptive 
mark and thus should avoid the time and expense related to filing.105 
The USPTO, for its part, has gone back and forth on the degree to which it 
encourages pro se applications. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the 
USPTO made several changes to make it easier to file applications and included 
more information online to assist non-attorneys who wished to file.106 More re-
cently the USPTO website is emphasizing the advantages of attorney assistance 
in filing trademark applications,107 perhaps in recognition of the disparity in suc-
cess rates and other anecdotal evidence of the benefits of legal representation. 
D. Candor in Trademark Prosecution 
As compared to patent prosecution, scholars and intellectual property at-
torneys pay significantly less attention to the duty of candor in trademark pros-
ecution.108 The phrases “duty of disclosure” and “inequitable conduct” are 
ubiquitous in the patent literature, and nearly every practitioner knows of The-
rasense, Inc. and its progeny.109 But as described below, similar concepts are 
carried into trademark practice and arguably should have similar force.110 
At the end of the federal trademark application form, there are a number 
of statements that must be acknowledged and signed.111 These statements in-
clude that “[t]he signatory believes that the applicant is the owner of the 
trademark/service mark sought to be registered,” that the mark is either being 
used in commerce or that the applicant has a bona fide intention to do so, and 
that the facts set forth in the application are true.112 Furthermore, the signatory 
must acknowledge that “[t]o the best of the signatory’s knowledge, infor-
mation, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Id. at 592. 
 106 See, e.g., Trademark FAQs, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/
learning-and-resources/trademark-faqs [https://perma.cc/B7ZH-G528]; Trademark Information Network, 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/process-overview/
trademark-information-network [https://perma.cc/7EBG-HWYX]. 
 107 See Hiring a U.S.-Licensed Attorney, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.
uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/why-hire-private-trademark-attorney [https://perma.cc/DCV8-
726X] (explaining the advantages of legal representation in trademark prosecution). 
 108 But see Linda K. McLeod & Stephanie H. Bald, Ethical Issues in U.S. Trademark Prosecution 
and TTAB Practice, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 365, 374 (2011) (discussing ethical du-
ties of trademark practitioners, including the duty of candor). 
 109 See, e.g., Ojemen, supra note 68, at 669 (discussing the duty of candor and the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct). 
 110 See McLeod & Bald, supra note 108, at 374. 
 111 For a PDF version of the application, including the statements that must be signed by the ap-
plicant, see Trademark/Service Mark Application, Principle Register, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/TEAS_Plus.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW7U-EWNT]. 
 112 Id. 
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the allegations and other factual contentions made [in the submitted applica-
tion] have evidentiary support.”113 The acknowledgements conclude with a 
warning that “willful false statements” could “jeopardize the validity of the 
application or submission or any registration resulting therefrom” or may lead 
to criminal prosecution.114 
Although rare, the TTAB has invalidated federal trademark registration 
where there is clear and convincing evidence that the applicant committed 
fraud in the procurement of the registration.115 Such fraud may occur by, 
among other things, fabricating specimens in support of applications or by 
making false statements related to the use of the mark in commerce.116 Persons 
committing such fraud are also liable for damages to those who have been 
harmed.117 Although the leading trademark fraud case, In re Bose Corp., 
seemed to heighten the standard for proving fraud from a showing of negli-
gence to evidence of an intent to deceive,118 the Federal Circuit left open the 
question of whether fraud could also be found based on a high degree of reck-
lessness.119 Indeed, In re Bose Corp. and Therasense, Inc. espouse very similar 
views as they relate to misrepresentations made to the USPTO, yet only the 
latter has endured in the practitioner lexicon. 
                                                                                                                           
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 See, e.g., Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Ahmad, 112 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1361, 1376 (T.T.A.B. 
2014) (invalidating use of “Nationstar” in connection with real estate business when it was clear 
that applicant had not been using the trademark in commerce). 
 116 See id.; see also Sarah Bro, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Sustains Opposition on the 
Basis of Fraud, JD SUPRA (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/trademark-trial-and-
appeal-board-sustain-82527/ [https://perma.cc/8HE3-SHC9] (discussing Nationstar Mortgage LLC 
and its import). 
 117 15 U.S.C. § 1120. 
 118 See 580 F.3d 1240, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[W]e hold that a trademark is obtained fraudulent-
ly under the Lanham Act only if the applicant or registrant knowingly makes a false, material repre-
sentation with the intent to deceive the PTO.”). In re Bose overruled Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro Vasx, Inc., 
which had applied an objective standard for determining whether an applicant acted knowingly. See 
generally Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro Vasx, Inc., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1205 (T.T.A.B. 2003); Brandon L. 
Harrell, Note, Federal Circuit Tightens Standard for Proving Intent to Deceive in Trademark Fraud 
Cases: In re Bose Corp., 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 313 (2009) (analyzing the In re Bose 
Corp. decision and its impact on fraud determinations). 
 119 See In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d at 1246 n.2 (“The PTO argues that under Torres, making a 
submission to the PTO with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity satisfies the intent to deceive re-
quirement. We need not resolve this issue here.”); see also Theodore H. Davis Jr. & Lauren Brenner, 
Allegations of Fraudulent Procurement and Maintenance of Federal Registrations Since In re Bose 
Corp., 104 TRADEMARK REP. 933, 936–43 (2014) (describing the various tests used for determining 
fraud following In re Bose Corp.). 
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II. REGULATION OF USPTO PRACTITIONERS 
Although most attorneys are familiar with the general workings of state bar 
admissions and discipline, the USPTO’s system operates somewhat differently. 
In fact, the USPTO is one of the few federal agencies to which Congress has 
given explicit authority to regulate the admissions and ethical conduct of those 
persons who practice before it.120 The USPTO established the OED in 1985 and 
administers both functions through it.121 This Part will describe the regulation of 
practitioners before the USPTO. It will begin by identifying the requirements for 
admission to practice that differ significantly between patent and trademark 
practitioners.122 It will then turn to a brief discussion of the OED’s disciplinary 
process, highlighting the key decision points and possible outcomes.123 
A. Admission to Practice in Patent Matters 
Patent law is somewhat unique in that both lawyers (patent attorneys) and 
non-lawyer professionals (patent agents) are eligible to practice, provided that 
those individuals meet the requirements and successfully apply for admis-
sion.124 Other than the fact that patent attorneys must be actively licensed at-
torneys in good standing with a state bar, there are no other differences be-
tween patent attorneys and patent agents, either in relation to admission re-
quirements or in the scope of permissible patent practice before the USPTO.125 
The USPTO collectively refers to both groups as “patent practitioners,”126 and 
it is for that reason that this Article uses the term “practitioner” rather than “at-
torney” when collectively referring to individuals who practice before the 
USPTO. All patent practitioners, including patent agents, are subject to the 
OED’s disciplinary authority.127 
The requirements to become a registered patent practitioner are analogous 
to those for state bar admission. First, an individual must show that he or she 
                                                                                                                           
 120 See 35 U.S.C. § 32 (2018) (giving the USPTO director the authority to discipline practition-
ers); Michael P. Cox, Regulation of Attorneys Practicing Before Federal Agencies, 34 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 173, 184 (1983–1984) (discussing congressional granting of authority to USPTO). 
 121 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PTD-10627-8-0001, OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT AND 
DISCIPLINE MUST CONDUCT MORE TIMELY INVESTIGATIONS OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST PRACTI-
TIONERS, at i (1998), https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/USPTO-PTD-10627-06-1998.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F8H5-698D]. 
 122 See discussion infra Parts II.A and II.B. 
 123 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 124 37 C.F.R. § 11.6(a)–(b) (2019). 
 125 See id.; David Hricik, Patent Agents: The Person You Are, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 261, 262 
(2007). 
 126 Patent and Trademark Practitioners, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.
uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/patent-and-trademark-practitioners [https://perma.cc/AG7H-Q8NV]. 
 127 See 37 C.F.R. § 11.19(a). 
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“[p]ossesses the legal, scientific, and technical qualifications necessary for him 
or her to render applicants valuable service.”128 Ordinarily, an individual will 
demonstrate these qualifications through receipt of a bachelor’s degree in a 
recognized scientific or technical field or a bachelor’s degree in another field 
along with a specified number of credit hours in a scientific or technical 
field.129 This requirement is analogous to that of most state bars, which require 
the successful completion of a Juris Doctorate degree, often from an ABA-
accredited law school.130 Second, an individual must show that he or she is 
“competent to advise and assist patent applicants in the presentation and prose-
cution of their applications before the Office.”131 This is generally accom-
plished by achieving a passing score on the patent registration examination, 
akin to passing a bar admission test.132 Third, an individual must show that he 
or she “possesses good moral character and reputation.”133 Ultimately, the 
OED Director makes a determination of an individual’s moral character and 
reputation pursuant to a character and fitness inquiry, similar to that which 
would be conducted by a state bar.134 
Once a practitioner meets these requirements, he or she is assigned a 
unique registration number and added to the USPTO’s register of attorneys and 
agents. As of April 8, 2020, there were 48,000 active patent practitioners: 
12,385 active patent agents and 35,615 active patent attorneys.135 
B. Admission to Practice in Trademark Matters 
In contrast to patent practice, the requirements to practice before the 
USPTO in trademark matters are much more streamlined. With very limited 
exceptions, only active licensed attorneys in good standing with a state bar 
                                                                                                                           
 128 Id. § 11.7(a)(2)(ii). 
 129 OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT & DISCIPLINE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL 
REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE 
IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, at 4–6 (2020), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OED_GRB.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FKK-MUNK]. 
 130 See, e.g., Rules for Admission to the Bar, MINN. ST. BD. L. EXAMINERS, https://www.ble.
mn.gov/rules/ [https://perma.cc/9MPF-5H9A] (requiring graduation from an ABA-accredited JD 
program). 
 131 37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a)(2)(iii). 
 132 See OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT & DISCIPLINE, supra note 129, at 20. 
 133 37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a)(2)(i). 
 134 See, e.g., Character and Fitness Requirements, MINN. ST. BD. L. EXAMINERS, https://www.
ble.mn.gov/character-and-fitness-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/MD2Y-9CS5] (identifying the char-
acter and fitness requirements for the Minnesota bar and providing resources for applicants). 
 135 Practitioner Roster, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI/
practitionerRoster [https://perma.cc/3G3Q-XQQZ]. The OED continually updates these numbers, 
which makes it difficult to have a comprehensive historical understanding of active practitioners. Id. 
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may represent others in trademark matters before the USPTO.136 Notably, non-
lawyer patent agents generally are not eligible to practice trademark law before 
the USPTO.137 
Perhaps because the USPTO does not impose additional substantive re-
quirements on those individuals who wish to represent others in trademark 
matters, it does not require an attorney to apply for recognition to practice be-
fore the USPTO nor does it assign that person a registration number when 
prosecuting trademark applications on behalf of a client. For these reasons, it is 
difficult to ascertain the number of “active” trademark practitioners because an 
attorney might prosecute a single application on behalf of a client and thereafter 
not do so again. The USPTO first learns of the involvement of a trademark 
attorney when an application is filed because the application asks whether an 
attorney is filing it.138 If the question is answered in the affirmative, the 
USPTO asks for basic contact information and will then communicate solely 
with the listed attorney regarding the application.139 
C. OED Disciplinary Process 
The OED disciplinary process may be triggered whenever the OED Di-
rector receives information that warrants an investigation.140 That information 
can come from a variety of sources, including “a client, an examiner, or anoth-
er member of the USPTO, through published decisions and news articles, or 
opposing counsel during an inter partes proceeding.”141 At that time, the prac-
titioner will be notified that an investigation has begun.142 The OED then con-
ducts a preliminary screening of the alleged violation that will often involve 
sending a request for information (RFI) to the practitioner.143 The practitioner 
is required, pursuant to the USPTO Rules, to respond accurately and complete-
ly to the RFI or face additional ethics charges.144 
There are four possible outcomes of an investigation. First, the OED Di-
rector may close the investigation without further action, presumably because 
                                                                                                                           
 136 37 C.F.R. § 11.14(a). 
 137 Id. § 11.14(b). There is a limited exception for non-attorneys who were permitted to prosecute 
trademarks prior to 1957, but that class of individuals is likely very small. Id. 
 138 Trademark Basics, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-
getting-started/trademark-basics [https://perma.cc/N4VK-E2PY]. 
 139 Id. 
 140 37 C.F.R. § 11.22(a). 
 141 DAVID HRICIK & MERCEDES MEYER, PATENT ETHICS: PROSECUTION § 1.03 (Matthew Bend-
er ed., 2016). 
 142 37 C.F.R. § 11.22(e). 
 143 Id. § 11.22(f)(1)(ii). 
 144 Id.; HRICIK & MEYER, supra note 141, § 1.03. 
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there are no grounds to proceed.145 Second, a warning letter may be issued to 
the practitioner. A warning is not public and not considered a disciplinary sanc-
tion, but it reminds practitioners of their duties under the USPTO Rules.146 
Third, the OED Director and practitioner may enter into a settlement agree-
ment. Settlement agreements are a common method of disposition,147 particu-
larly for practitioners who wish to maintain an uninterrupted practice before 
the USPTO.148 Fourth, the OED Director may find that there has been a viola-
tion of the Rules and convene the Committee on Discipline (COD), a three-
member panel appointed by the USPTO Director.149 The COD will then inde-
pendently determine whether there is probable cause to proceed in the discipli-
nary matter and make a recommendation to the OED Director.150 
Formal disciplinary hearings are conducted by an administrative law 
judge, who serves as the hearing officer for the proceeding.151 Assuming that 
the complaint is not dismissed, there are four possible sanctions that may be 
imposed: (1) exclusion from practice, (2) suspension, (3) public reprimand, or 
(4) probation.152 The first three sanctions, however, are mutually exclusive: 
“[p]robation may be imposed in lieu of or in addition to any other disciplinary 
sanction.”153 In determining the appropriate sanction, a hearing officer is re-
quired to consider the following factors: 
(1) Whether the practitioner has violated a duty owed to a client, to 
the public, to the legal system, or to the profession; (2) [w]hether the 
practitioner acted intentionally, knowingly, or negligently; (3) [t]he 
amount of actual or potential injury caused by the practitioner’s 
misconduct; and (4) [t]he existence of any aggravating or mitigating 
factors.154 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See 37 C.F.R. § 11.22(h)(1). 
 146 See id. § 11.22(h)(2); Presentation at 12th Annual Advanced Patent Law Institute, U.S. Patent 
& Trademark Office, Select OED Procedure, Statistics, and Case Law, at 3–4 (Mar. 10, 2017) [here-
inafter USPTO Presentation], https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Advanced_Patent_
Law_Institute_2017_Slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS2Y-79W4] (describing warning letters and pre-
senting statistics on their issuance). 
 147 Of the 410 public disciplinary actions between 2003 and 2018, 206 (50.2%) involved a settle-
ment agreement. 
 148 See 37 C.F.R. § 11.22(h)(4); see, e.g., In re Guth, No. D2010-37, at 6 (U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office Feb. 11, 2011) (final order) (using cooperation with OED and related reconciliation as a 
mitigating factor). 
 149 37 C.F.R. §§ 11.22(h)(3), 11.23(a). 
 150 Id. § 11.23(b). 
 151 See id. § 11.39 (referencing regulation authorizing appointment of administrative law judge to 
serve as hearing officer). 
 152 Id. § 11.20(a). 
 153 Id. § 11.20(a)(4). 
 154 Id. § 11.54(b). 
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A disciplined practitioner has the right to appeal the initial decision first 
to the OED Director, and subsequently to the U.S. District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia.155 
Special attention must be paid to the imposition of reciprocal discipline at 
the USPTO, given its prevalence and the differences in how discipline is im-
posed in such cases. Lawyers who practice before the USPTO have an affirma-
tive obligation to notify the OED Director when they have been disciplined by 
another jurisdiction or federal agency.156 But even if they fail to do so, the 
OED itself proactively searches state lawyer disciplinary records and identifies 
anyone within its purview who has been disciplined.157 In either case, the OED 
director will file a complaint with the USPTO Director, without COD in-
volvement, based on the other discipline.158 Even though a practitioner is re-
quested to respond to the complaint, there are extremely limited grounds on 
which the practitioner may challenge the imposition of an identical sanction by 
the USPTO.159 Indeed, the USPTO Director has a reputation for successfully 
rebuffing challenges to reciprocal discipline160 that rarely go beyond consid-
eration of the documentary record.161 
Once any type of public discipline has been imposed, the OED Director 
will issue a final decision.162 That final decision is publicly available on the 
OED Reading Room website, which can be accessed by conducting a search of 
the practitioner’s name, or by using the free text search feature.163 Information 
                                                                                                                           
 155 35 U.S.C. § 32. 
 156 37 C.F.R. § 11.24. 
 157 HRICIK & MEYER, supra note 141. 
 158 See 37 C.F.R. § 11.24(a). 
 159 See id. § 11.24(d)(1)(i)–(iv). Acceptable challenges to reciprocal discipline include: 
(i) The procedure elsewhere was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to 
constitute a deprivation of due process; (ii) [t]here was such infirmity of proof estab-
lishing the conduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the Office could not, con-
sistently with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; (iii) [t]he imposi-
tion of the same public censure, public reprimand, probation, disbarment, suspension or 
disciplinary disqualification by the Office would result in grave injustice; or (iv) [a]ny 
argument that the practitioner was not publicly censured, publicly reprimanded, placed 
on probation, disbarred, suspended or disciplinarily disqualified. 
Id. 
 160 See Michael E. McCabe, Jr., Enter the Sandman: USPTO Unhittable in Reciprocal Discipline 
Proceedings, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/22/uspto-unhit-
table-in-reciprocal-discipline/id=51327/ [https://perma.cc/WB2K-LD9L] (discussing the USPTO’s 
perfect 77-0 record in reciprocal discipline cases). 
 161 USPTO Presentation, supra note 146, at 8 (acknowledging the straightforward nature of its 
reciprocal discipline cases). 
 162 37 C.F.R. § 11.56. 
 163 FOIA Documents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://e-foia.uspto.gov/Foia/OED
ReadingRoom.jsp [https://perma.cc/9PTQ-Y8U5]. 
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about the practitioner’s misconduct and sanction are also published in the Offi-
cial Gazette.164 
III. USPTO ETHICS RULES: A PRIMER 
This Article aims to empirically study the imposition of USPTO disci-
pline between 2003 and 2018. As a preliminary matter, therefore, it is neces-
sary to identify and understand the USPTO’s ethics rules. This is not a straight-
forward task. The USPTO transitioned from the Patent and Trademark Office 
Code of Professional Responsibility (USPTO Code) to the USPTO Rules of 
Professional Conduct (USPTO Rules) on May 3, 2013.165 Accordingly, this 
Part first describes the structure and features of the prior USPTO Code.166 It 
then turns to a discussion of the USPTO Rules, focusing on the reasons for the 
transition and the key differences between the USPTO Rules and the ABA 
Rules.167 The Part continues with a proposed mapping between the USPTO 
Code, USPTO Rules, and ABA Rules, which will become the basis for the 
analysis presented in Part V.168 
A. The USPTO Code (1985–2013) 
The USPTO Code was based on the ABA Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility (ABA Code)169 that was adopted in 1969170 but replaced in 
1983 by the ABA Model Rules.171 Indeed, the ABA’s transition from the Model 
Code to the Model Rules likely precipitated the creation of the USPTO Code, 
because the USPTO had previously just incorporated the ABA Code by refer-
                                                                                                                           
 164 See, e.g., Notice of Suspension, 1455 OFF. GAZ. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE 67, 131 (2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2018/week41/TOC.htm [https://perma.cc/3KKX-XJ85] 
(publishing a notice of suspension); Notice of Public Reprimand and Probation, 1455 OFF. GAZ. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFFICE 67, 134 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2018/week41/
TOC.htm [https://perma.cc/A8FS-UETJ] (publishing a notice of public reprimand and probation). 
 165 Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
78 Fed. Reg. 20,179, 20,179 (Apr. 3, 2013) (to be codified in scattered parts of 37 C.F.R.); see also 
Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Updates Prof’l Conduct Rules and Registra-
tion Examination for Patent Att’ys (Apr. 3, 2013), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/
uspto-updates-professional-conduct-rules-and-registration-examination-patent [https://perma.cc/KF2U-
EJVH] (announcing the adoption of the USPTO Rules). 
 166 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 167 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 168 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 169 See Practice Before the Patent and Trademark Office, 50 Fed. Reg. 5,158, 5,159 (Feb. 6, 1985) 
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 2, 10). 
 170 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
 171 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
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ence and applied those provisions to practitioners.172 Like the ABA Code, the 
USPTO Code contained nine canons that were “statements of axiomatic 
norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct ex-
pected of practitioners in their relationships with the public, with the legal sys-
tem, and with the legal profession.”173 These canons had no real disciplinary 
force—indeed, there were no USPTO disciplinary orders in the years under 
study that had been predicated on the violation of a canon—but they were used 
as guiding principles under which the disciplinary rules were organized.174 
Although the USPTO Code was based on the ABA Code, it also included 
a multitude of rules that were specific to practitioners’ work before the Office. 
Indeed, the section labeled “misconduct” contained six subsections and further 
listed an additional twenty categories of behavior that constituted misconduct 
before the USPTO.175 Included among these categories was 37 C.F.R. 
§ 10.23(c)(3) that proscribed “[m]isappropriation of, or failure to properly or 
timely remit, funds received by a practitioner or the practitioner’s firm from a 
client to pay a fee which the client is required by law to pay to the [USPTO] 
Office.”176 The specific conduct identified in these categories would have oth-
erwise violated other enacted rules (for example, the prohibition on neglecting 
a legal matter),177 but they provided clear examples of the types of misconduct 
that could occur in the course of USPTO practice.178 
In a few instances, the USPTO Code was more permissive than the ABA 
Code. For example, the USPTO Code carved out an exception to the general 
prohibition on practitioners acquiring a proprietary interest in the subject mat-
ter of the representation, under which they were permitted to “take an interest 
in the patent as part or all of his or her fee.”179 This provision condoned a long-
standing practice between patent applicants and practitioners, analogous to a 
contingency fee that lawyers had traditionally been permitted to collect.180 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See Practice Before the Patent and Trademark Office, 50 Fed. Reg. at 5,158 (describing the 
adoption of the USPTO Code). 
 173 Id. at 5,175. 
 174 See id. 
 175 37 C.F.R § 10.23(b)–(c) (2012) (repealed 2013). 
176 Id. § 10.23(c). 
 177 See id. § 10.77(c) (proscribing “[n]eglect[ing] a legal matter entrusted to the practitioner”). 
 178 See, e.g., id. § 10.23(c)(15) (prohibiting the act of “making a scandalous or indecent statement 
in a paper filed in the [USPTO] Office”). 
 179 Id. § 10.64(a)(3). 
 180 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“Contingent 
fee arrangements in civil cases have long been commonly accepted in the United States in proceedings 
to enforce claims.”). 
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The USPTO Code was clear that it did not preempt the authority of states 
to regulate attorneys who practiced before them.181 What this meant for attor-
neys, at least, was that they were subject to at least two disciplinary authorities—
the state disciplinary authority and the OED—each potentially having signifi-
cantly different ethics rules. Although practitioners were required to conduct 
themselves according to the more restrictive standard, “sometimes the rules were 
so different, it was hard to know which standard was more restrictive.”182 
B. The USPTO Rules (2013–Present) 
Given the confusion surrounding the differences between the USPTO 
Code and the ABA Rules, which had been adopted widely, the USPTO devel-
oped and eventually adopted a new set of ethics rules that drew heavily on the 
ABA Rules.183 In fact, the USPTO published a document on its website at the 
time of the transition comparing the ABA Rules to the USPTO Rules that is a 
helpful resource for attorney-practitioners who are already familiar with the 
former.184 
In the Executive Summary that accompanied the new rules, the USPTO 
stated that it believed that practitioners would “benefit from modernization of 
the regulations governing professional conduct before the Office and harmoni-
zation of these regulations with corresponding rules adopted by bars in the 
States and the District of Columbia.”185 Although licensed attorneys still must 
adhere to two sets of rules—and may be subject to reciprocal discipline if they 
are disciplined in another state186—the new USPTO Rules were intended to 
                                                                                                                           
 181 Practice Before the Patent and Trademark Office, 50 Fed. Reg. at 5,158. The Federal Register 
notes: 
In issuing these rules, the PTO has made every effort to minimize preemption of State 
control over the practice of law. Thus, in § 10.1, second sentence, the new rules pro-
vide: Nothing in * * * [these rules] shall be construed to preempt the authority of each 
State to maintain control over the practice of law, except to the extent necessary for the 
Patent and Trademark Office to accomplish its federal objectives. 
Id. (alterations in original). 
 182 Steven Seidenberg, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Adopts Ethics Guidelines That Closely 
Follow the ABA Model Rules, ABA J. (July 1, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
u.s._patent_and_trademark_office_adopts_ethics_guidelines_that_closely_foll/ [https://perma.cc/
KQ3H-YDGC] (quoting Professor Lisa A. Dolak of Syracuse University College of Law). 
 183 Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 165. 
 184 US. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ABA AND USPTO RULE COMPARISON CHART [herein-
after RULE COMPARISON CHART], https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/AbavsUSPTO.
pdf [https://perma.cc/CDT6-EJE8]. 
 185 Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 20,180. 
 186 See 37 C.F.R. §§ 11.24, 11.804(h) (2019). 
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“clarify[] and streamline[] their professional responsibility obligations.”187 The 
USPTO also anticipated that practitioners would benefit from disciplinary ac-
tions and judicial opinions from states that had adopted the ABA Model Rules, 
although it contemplated that eventually precedent specifically addressing 
practice before the USPTO would develop after the USPTO rules were imple-
mented.188 
Given that the USPTO Rules were explicitly modeled after the ABA 
Rules, it raises the question of how—and why—the USPTO Rules diverge 
from the ABA Rules. One would expect there to be significant inertia around 
maintaining consistency between the two codes, meaning that changes would 
only be made on account of the unique features of USPTO practice or its prior-
ities in regulating practitioners. 
After a thorough review of both sets of codes, this Article identifies four 
primary categories of divergences. Each category is described below, together 
with relevant examples and commentary on the likely reasons for the divergence. 
1. Practice Differences 
The USPTO Rules contain a number of semantic changes that reflect the 
practice setting and the fact that those who practice before the USPTO are not 
necessarily attorneys. For example, USPTO Rules 11.102189 and 11.105 (mod-
eled after ABA Rules 1.2 and 1.5, respectively)190 eliminated references to con-
duct in criminal or domestic relations matters, because those issues should not 
arise in patent or trademark litigation.191 Whereas ABA Rule 7.4 contains gen-
eral guidance on the way in which attorneys may hold themselves out to the pub-
lic, USPTO Rule 11.704 contains detailed information on who may hold them-
selves out as patent agents and patent attorneys, as well as additional limits on 
non-lawyers holding themselves out as authorized to practice trademark law.192 
                                                                                                                           
 187 Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 20,180. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Although the official citation to the USPTO Rules would be 37 C.F.R. § 11.XXX, this Article 
will hereinafter refer to the USPTO Rules in the following manner in the main text: USPTO Rule 
11.XXX. 
 190 RULE COMPARISON CHART, supra note 184, at 4–5, 6–8. 
 191 Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 20,180. 
 192 RULE COMPARISON CHART, supra note 184, at 53–54. For another example, USPTO Rule 
11.101, which governs competence representation, added “scientific” and “technical” knowledge to 
the legal knowledge required. Id. 
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2. Harmonizing Provisions 
Several USPTO provisions were crafted to further align the USPTO Rules 
with obligations under state ethics rules or other ABA guidance. For example, 
USPTO Rule 11.115, which governs accounting and recordkeeping, provides 
that lawyers will be deemed in compliance with the Rule if they otherwise 
meet the corresponding requirements for the state in which they are actively 
licensed. The Rule further provides that non-lawyer practitioners will be 
deemed in compliance if they are part of a firm that maintains records that 
meet the requirements in a state in which one of their practitioners is a licensed 
attorney.193 These rules have the effects of reducing confusion and streamlining 
compliance, which were two goals of adopting the USPTO Rules.194 
3. Non-Adoption of Ancillary Rules 
The USPTO declined to adopt a number of rules that this Article is term-
ing “ancillary,” meaning that they are not generally the subject of disciplinary 
proceedings because they are (1) explanatory, (2) aspirational, or (3) uncom-
mon occurrences. An example of an explanatory provision is ABA Rule 1.2(b), 
which provides that legal representation “does not constitute an endorsement 
of the client’s political, economic, social or moral activities.”195 ABA Rule 6.1 
is an aspirational provision, encouraging lawyers to provide at least fifty hours 
of pro bono service annually.196 Two examples of uncommon occurrences in-
clude ABA Rule 1.8(j), which regulates sexual relations with clients, and ABA 
Rule 7.6, which proscribes political contributions for obtaining legal engage-
ments or appointments.197 Even though these provisions were not formally 
adopted, the USPTO clarified that lawyer-practitioners would nevertheless be 
subject to these ancillary rules if they practiced in a jurisdiction that had adopt-
ed them, and that such conduct could very well violate one or more provisions 
of USPTO Rule 11.804, the general misconduct section.198 
                                                                                                                           
 193 Id. 
 194 See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 165. 
 195 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
 196 Id. r. 6.1. 
 197 Id. r. 1.8, r. 7.6. 
 198 See, e.g., Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,183. The Federal Register notes: 
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4. Substantive Deviations 
The USPTO Rules contain several substantive deviations from the ABA 
Rules. Unlike the three preceding categories, each of these substantive devia-
tions reflects a policy decision made by the USPTO to regulate practitioner 
conduct in a different manner than the ABA Rules would provide. These devia-
tions could potentially have a significant impact on practitioner conduct, as 
well as on the OED’s disciplinary function. 
a. Duty of Disclosure and Inequitable Conduct 
As discussed in Part II.B, patent practitioners have a duty to disclose in-
formation that is material to patentability. In addition to the threat of having a 
client’s patent invalidated, a violation of the duty of disclosure may lead to 
USPTO disciplinary action. USPTO Code 11.303 mandates that practitioners 
“disclose to the Office information necessary to comply with applicable duty 
of disclosure provisions,” which is further reiterated in subsection 11.106(c).199 
Furthermore, the USPTO Rules make it clear that a practitioner may not claim 
concerns of client confidentiality as a reason for non-disclosure. Subsections 
11.106(a)(2) and (a)(3) both contain confidentiality exceptions for practitioners 
who reveal information to prevent or rectify injury caused by a client’s inequi-
table conduct before the USPTO. The explanation accompanying the final rule 
states that “[t]he practitioner’s responsibility to present the client’s case with 
persuasive force is qualified by the practitioner’s duty of candor to the tribu-
nal,” exhibiting a preference for the duty of candor.200 
b. Fraud 
The scienter required for fraud under the USPTO Rules is lower than that 
under the ABA Model Rules, as it may be satisfied by “intent to deceive or a 
state of mind so reckless respecting consequences as to be the equivalent of 
intent.”201 By contrast, the ABA definition of fraud looks to state substantive 
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 199 Id. at 20,184–85. 
 200 Id. at 20,185; see Kyle R. Kroll, Essay, Prosecuting Inequitable Conduct, 102 MINN. L. REV. 
HEADNOTES 49, 57 (2018) (discussing the prevalence of patent fraud before the USPTO and the ap-
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 201 37 C.F.R. § 11.1 (2019) (emphasis added). “Fraud” or “fraudulent” is defined as: 
conduct that involves a misrepresentation of material fact made with intent to deceive 
or a state of mind so reckless respecting consequences as to be the equivalent of intent, 
where there is justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation by the party deceived, induc-
 
1642 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1613 
law, but also requires a showing that a lawyer has a “purpose to deceive.”202 In 
support of its position, the USPTO cited a number of patent cases in which it 
had adopted the common-law definition of fraud.203 Interestingly, the USPTO 
did not identify any trademark cases that had adopted the standard (nor did it 
address the question left open in In re Bose about whether recklessness could 
suffice), but the fraud definition in the USPTO Rules applies with equal force 
in patent and trademark matters.204 
c. Disclosure in Ex Parte Proceedings 
The USPTO Rules carry a heightened duty of disclosure for ex parte pro-
ceedings, requiring practitioners under USPTO Rule 11.303 to disclose both 
known legal authority and material facts that are directly adverse to their cli-
ent’s position. Notably, the USPTO justifies this deviation by stating that “[a]ll 
decisions made by the Office in patent and trademark matters affect the public 
interest” and that many of them are made ex parte.205 
d. Misconduct 
Although the USPTO’s misconduct section largely tracks the ABA ver-
sion, it does contain two additional provisions of note.206 First, it includes a 
specific provision related to the imposition of reciprocal discipline. This provi-
sion provides that a practitioner (in this case, a lawyer) who is publicly disci-
plined by another authority will be deemed to have committed misconduct and 
                                                                                                                           
ing the party to act thereon, and where there is injury to the party deceived resulting 
from reliance on the misrepresentation. Fraud also may be established by a purposeful 
omission or failure to state a material fact, which omission or failure to state makes oth-
er statements misleading, and where the other elements of justifiable reliance and injury 
are established. 
Id. 
 202 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(d) (“‘Fraud’ or ‘fraudulent’ denotes conduct 
that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a pur-
pose to deceive.”). 
 203 Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 20,181 (citing Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Ekrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1358 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) and In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 807 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 204 See Stephanie H. Bald & Linda K. McLeod, Ethical Issues for Trademark Lawyers Practicing 
Before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, LANDSLIDE, May–June 2013, at 33, 36 (discussing the 
new fraud definition in the context of trademark practice). 
 205 Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 20,184; see Leonard Raykinsteen, Ethical Considerations in Intellectual Property 
Law, 99 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 47, 61 (2017) (discussing the heightened obligations of 
patent practitioners because the work affects the public interest). 
 206 See RULE COMPARISON CHART, supra note 184, at 56–57. 
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thus subject to USPTO discipline as well.207 This provision, though not includ-
ed in the ABA Rules, is not a deviation from its spirit because it is included 
within another ABA-approved code, the ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disci-
plinary Enforcement.208 Its presence is worth noting, however, given the high 
percentage of USPTO disciplinary actions that impose reciprocal discipline.209 
Second, the USPTO Rules contain an additional subsection that covers 
“other conduct that adversely reflects on the practitioner’s fitness to practice 
before the Office.”210 This provision was carried over from the earlier USPTO 
Code and is analogous to a provision of the earlier ABA Code, which pro-
scribed “conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice 
law.”211 This provision somewhat fell out of favor, however, as challenges be-
gan to mount over the enforceability of the provision on grounds of vagueness 
and overbreadth.212 Nevertheless, several state disciplinary codes have retained 
the provision despite its absence in the ABA Rules, which counsels against 
putting too much weight into the USPTO’s decision to retain it.213 
e. Conflict of Interest Fee Provisions 
The USPTO Rules continue to allow practitioners to acquire interests in 
patents or patent applications as their fee in matters before the Office, as was 
permitted under the USPTO Code.214 Although this provision is more lenient 
than under the ABA Rules, it is still subject to the other conflict of interest lim-
itations including 11.108(a), which requires that the transaction be fair and rea-
sonable to the client and that the client give written informed consent to its 
                                                                                                                           
 207 37 C.F.R. § 11.804(h) (2019). 
 208 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (providing for 
reciprocal discipline). See generally Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Automatic Reporting of Lawyer 
Misconduct to Disciplinary Authorities: Filling the Reporting Gap, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 437 
(2012). 
 209 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 210 37 C.F.R. § 11.804(i). 
 211 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(6) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
 212 See, e.g., Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Martin, 518 A.2d 1050, 1054 (Md. 1987); see also Don-
ald T. Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEX. L. REV. 
267, 276 (1970) (expressing “uncertain[ty of] what conduct will be held to reflect adversely on fitness 
to practice law”). But see generally Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously: Broad Ethics 
Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 77 
TUL. L. REV. 527 (2003) (calling on scholars to reconsider their criticism of broad ethics rules, includ-
ing the fitness to practice rule). 
 213 See, e.g., ALABAMA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2019); MASSACHUSETTS RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(h) (2019) (proscribing “any other conduct that adversely reflects on his or 
her fitness to practice law”). 
 214 See 37 C.F.R. § 11.108(i)(3). 
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terms.215 The USPTO Rules also allow practitioners to advance costs and ex-
penses in connection with proceedings before the Office,216 as well as fees that 
are “required to prevent or remedy an abandonment of a client’s application” 
due to practitioner misconduct.217 
These lenient and flexible fee provisions appear to recognize that the 
types of matters before the USPTO differ from those at the root of the concerns 
behind the conflict of interest fee provisions that appear in the ABA Rules.218 
Whereas patent and trademark matters are commercial enterprises (and the 
stereotypical client a sophisticated businessperson), the ABA Rules must be 
designed to cover a wider range of litigation and transactional matters and cli-
ent bases. 
Collectively, these substantive deviations from the ABA Rules largely re-
flect the heightened obligation of good faith expected of practitioners in their 
actions before the USPTO. For patent cases this obligation includes the so-
called “duty of disclosure,” but all practitioners are expected to disclose ad-
verse facts and law in ex parte proceedings and are subject to discipline for 
highly reckless misrepresentations, irrespective of the type of proceeding.219 
C. Mapping the Various Ethics Codes 
There is no definitive mapping that exists between the USPTO Code and 
the USPTO Rules. This study first aimed to develop such a mapping so that 
disciplinary actions could be analyzed across years. The table below presents 
the first ever mapping between those two sets of ethics codes for the discipli-
nary rules that have been the subject of public discipline, together with the cor-
responding provisions of the ABA Rules and a category description. 
                                                                                                                           
 215 See Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,183. 
 216 37 C.F.R. § 11.108(e)(3). 
 217 Id. § 11.108(e)(4). 
 218 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). The comment 
notes:  
Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of 
their clients, including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses, 
because to do so would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be 
brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the liti-
gation. 
Id.; see also id. at cmt. 16 (“Paragraph (i) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited 
from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. Like paragraph (e), the general rule has its basis in 
common law champerty and maintenance and is designed to avoid giving the lawyer too great an 
interest in the representation.”). 
 219 See 37 C.F.R. § 11.303. 
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Nearly all of the USPTO Code provisions could be successfully mapped 
to a corresponding USPTO Rule section.220 The only exception was for 
USPTO Code 10.23(a), which provided that “[a] practitioner shall not engage 
in disreputable or gross misconduct.”221 In reviewing each of the disciplinary 
actions for which 10.23(a) was violated, however, it became clear that it was 
nearly always identified along with more specific rules that described the precise 
type of misconduct involved.222 There were two disciplinary actions that identi-
fied only 10.23(a) as the rule that had been violated, but in both instances there 
was clearly another specific provision that applied.223 Those two rules were re-
coded accordingly and 10.23(a) was omitted from the analysis in Part V. 
In total, the study identified only thirty-three categories over the sixteen-
year period. This finding suggests that the USPTO relies on relatively few 
rules as the basis for discipline, a topic explored later in the Article.224 
                                                                                                                           
 220 The initial plan was to map all the individual subsections of the USPTO Code and USPTO 
Rules, but that task proved intractable given the differences between the USPTO Code and USPTO 
Rules, as well as unnecessary given the low number of disciplinary actions. Thus, the provisions were 
generally mapped at the ABA Rules section level, with subsections mapped for general rules that 
included many disparate subsections (for example, misconduct and specific conflict of interest provi-
sions). The only other exception was for the conflict of interest category, for which there were many 
differences between the USPTO Rules and USPTO Code. 
 221 37 C.F.R. § 10.23 (2012) (repealed 2013). 
 222 See, e.g., In re Maiorino, No. D2004-11, at 1 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Aug. 9, 2004) 
(final order) (finding violations of 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.23(a), 10.23(b)(3), 10.23(b)(6), and 10.23(c)(l) for a 
sexual assault conviction). 
 223 In re Fuller, No. D2013-23, at 1 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Mar. 12, 2014) (final 
order) (finding that respondent illegally photographed other persons); In re York, No. D2013-19, at 8–
9 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Nov. 18, 2013) (final order) (finding a violation of terms of fee 
sharing agreement with associated law firm). 
 224 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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Description ABA Rule USPTO Rule USPTO Code 
Competence 1.1 11.101 10.77(a), 10.77(b) 
Scope of Representa-
tion 
1.2 11.102 No equivalent rule 
Diligence / Neglect 1.3 11.103 
10.77(c), 10.84, 
10.23(c)(3) 
Communication 1.4 11.104 10.23(c)(8) 
Fees 1.5 11.105 10.36 
Confidentiality 1.6 11.106 10.57 
Conflict of Interest 
1.7, 1.9(a), 
1.10 
11.107, 11.109(a), 
11.110 
10.62(a), 10.66 
Business Transaction 
with Client 
1.8(a) 11.108(a) 10.65 
Influence from Third-
Party Payer 
1.8(f) 11.108(f) 10.68 
Limitation on Liability 1.8(h) 11.108(h) 10.78 
USPTO / Gov’t Em-
ployee 
1.11 11.111 10.23(c)(19)–(20) 
Safekeeping Property 1.15 11.115 10.112 
Withdrawal / Termi-
nation 
1.16 11.116 10.40 
Candid Advice 2.1 11.201 No equivalent 
Non-Meritorious 
Claims 
3.1 11.301 10.39 
False Statements / 
Fraud Before Office 
3.3 11.303 
10.85, 
10.23(c)(2)(ii), 
10.23(c)(14)–(15) 
Fairness to Opposing 
Party and Counsel 
3.4 11.304 10.89(c) 
Ex Parte Communi-
cations 
3.5(b) 11.305(b) 10.93 
False Statements to 
Third Parties 
4.1 11.401 No equivalent rule 
Violation in Non-
Lawyer Assistance 
5.3 11.503 No equivalent rule 
Improper Non-
Practitioner Relation-
ship 
5.4 11.504 10.37, 10.48, 10.49 
Assisting in Unau-
thorized Practice 
5.5 11.505 10.23(c)(6), 10.47 
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False Advertising 7.1 11.701 10.31 
Improper Advertising 7.2 11.702 10.32 
Improper Solicitation 7.3 11.703 10.33 
Office Admission 
Candor 
8.1 11.801 10.22(a) 
Reporting Misconduct 8.3 11.803 10.24, 10.23(c)(16) 
Violation Through 
Others 
8.4(a) 11.804(a) 10.23(b)(2) 
Criminal Acts 8.4(b) 11.804(b) 10.23(b)(3) & (c)(1) 
General Misrepresen-
tation 
8.4(c) 11.804(c) 
10.23(b)(4), 
10.23(c)(2)(i) 
Administration of 
Justice 
8.4(d) 11.804(d) 
10.23(b)(5), 
10.23(c)(9) 
Reciprocal Discipline No equivalent 11.804(h) 10.23(c)(5) 
General Unfitness to 
Practice 
No equivalent 11.804(i) 10.23(b)(6) 
Disreputable or Gross 
Misconduct 
No equivalent No equivalent 10.23(a) 
IV. PRACTITIONER DISCIPLINE: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
To evaluate the extent to which the OED is successful in carrying out its 
responsibilities, this Part identifies and describes the purposes of practitioner 
discipline and sanctions to provide the standards by which its work may be 
judged.225 Although a complete treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of 
this Article,226 several prevailing theories will be discussed. They will then be 
framed within the somewhat distinct setting of USPTO practice to determine 
the extent to which one or more theories should carry special weight. 
A. Purposes of Practitioner Discipline 
At the outset, it is important to note that disciplinary bodies and courts re-
viewing such cases rarely discuss the purposes behind imposing discipline out-
side of the context of a specific adjudication.227 This phenomenon has not been 
lost on those scholars, who argue forcefully that professional regulators should 
                                                                                                                           
 225 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 226 See generally Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1998); Zacharias, supra note 33. 
 227 See Laurel S. Terry et al., Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession, 80 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 2685, 2721–22 (2012) (noting that no U.S. jurisdiction has adopted regulatory objectives 
for the profession, and contrasting it with other nations). 
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more explicitly identify and prioritize the purposes behind discipline in order 
to promote effectiveness and consistency.228 Indeed, the lack of such guidance 
would make it difficult for those who impose discipline to know how to do so 
when there are competing considerations at stake. Nevertheless, several themes 
predominate. 
The first purpose, and the one most often cited, is the “protection of the 
public.”229 What is precisely meant by the phrase is up for debate, as it is 
sometimes described in terms of the practitioner’s clients who have been di-
rectly affected by the misconduct.230 Such a narrow conception is not fully ex-
planatory, however, because discipline is imposed on conduct that has already 
occurred and often does not include restitution to the client who has been 
harmed. A second conception of “public” implicates protecting the practition-
er’s other clients or future clients.231 This purpose can be accomplished in one 
of three ways: (1) by incapacitating the practitioner (through a term suspension 
or exclusion), (2) by giving notice to others of the practitioner’s misconduct 
and thereby affecting whether and how they engage with the practitioner, and 
(3) by decreasing the likelihood that the practitioner engages in such miscon-
duct again. But there is still a third conception of the “public,” one that extends 
beyond the immediate practitioner-client relationship to others who might be 
harmed.232 This could include persons other than clients who would be ad-
versely impacted were this practitioner to commit this type of misconduct in 
the future. It could even be extended to include others who would be adversely 
impacted if another practitioner were to commit this type of misconduct, under 
the theory that the imposition of discipline against one practitioner might deter 
others from committing misconduct themselves.233 
The second purpose behind lawyer discipline is the protection of the ad-
ministration of justice.234 This purpose is evident in many rules adopted by 
                                                                                                                           
 228 See Zacharias, supra note 33, at 733–34. 
 229 Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 7 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 939 (1994); Levin, supra note 226, at 20. 
 230 See Zacharias, supra note 33, at 695. 
 231 See id.; Janine C. Ogando, Note, Sanctioning Unfit Lawyers: The Need for Public Protection, 
5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 462 (1991) (noting that “[c]lients and future clients potentially suffer 
the most harmful consequences” when courts do not appropriately sanction attorneys). 
 232 See Ogando, supra note 231, at 462 (directly linking lawyer discipline to the need for broadly 
conceived public protection). 
 233 See Stephen Gillers, Lowering the Bar: How Lawyer Discipline in New York Fails to Protect 
the Public, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 485, 494 (2014); Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professional 
Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 
14 (2002). 
 234 Levin, supra note 226, at 17; see, e.g., In re Gortmaker, 782 P.2d 421, 424 (Or. 1989) (“The 
purpose of professional discipline is to protect the public and the administration of justice from law-
yers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely to properly discharge their profes-
sional duties to their clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession.”). 
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disciplinary authorities, including ABA Rule 8.4(d), which explicitly prohibits 
lawyers from “engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.”235 But its presence can also be seen through ABA Rules 3.1–3.9, 
which impose discipline for a variety of activities that may have an adverse 
impact on an adjudication, and in the Preamble to the ABA Rules that reminds 
lawyers that they are “officer[s] of the legal system and . . . public citizen[s] 
having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”236 Thus, this purpose 
pervades the ABA Rules and provides a lens through which they should be 
understood. 
The third purpose behind practitioner discipline is to instill and preserve 
confidence in the legal profession.237 This purpose comes under fire by schol-
ars on account of the legal profession’s insistence on self-regulation that leads 
some to question the degree to which discipline may be legitimately and accu-
rately imposed.238 Nevertheless, proponents of self-regulation tout the discipli-
nary process, and in particular the public imposition of discipline,239 as essen-
tial for preserving public confidence.240 This purpose has led scholars such as 
Leslie Levin to argue in favor of increased transparency in disciplinary pro-
ceedings and broad publication of disciplinary proceedings.241 It has also 
fueled pushes for increased consistency, both across and within disciplinary 
bodies, in the imposition of discipline and sanctions imposed.242 Indeed, the 
ABA Rules have been adopted in whole or large part by forty-nine states (Cali-
fornia being the only exception) and four U.S. Territories, which should, in 
                                                                                                                           
 235 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
 236 Id. r. 3.1–.9. 
 237 Devlin, supra note 229, at 939; Levin, supra note 226, at 17–18. 
 238 See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 853 
(1992); Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1151 (2009); see also 
Allen Blumenthal, Attorney Self-Regulation, Consumer Protection, and the Future of the Legal Pro-
fession, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 6, 11 (1993–1994). 
 239 Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 
29 (2007); Jacquelyn M. Desch, Note, Attorney Discipline Online, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 921, 938 
(2016). 
 240 See COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENF’T, AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER REGULA-
TION FOR A NEW CENTURY (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
resources/report_archive/mckay_report/ [https://perma.cc/XQ59-4LX7] (recommending greater ac-
cess to disciplinary action); see also Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C. Clark’s Legacy in the Field 
of Legal Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 66 (2005). 
 241 See Levin, supra note 226, at 71; see also Jennifer Carpenter & Thomas Cluderay, Note, Im-
plications of Online Disciplinary Records: Balancing the Public’s Interest in Openness with Attor-
neys’ Concerns for Maintaining Flexible Self-Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 733, 740 (2009). 
 242 See Ogando, supra note 231, at 464. 
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theory at least, serve to limit the variability across jurisdictions in terms of the 
types of misconduct that are subject to discipline.243 
B. The Role of Sanctions 
With these three purposes in mind—protection of the public, promotion 
of the administration of justice, and the instilling of confidence in the legal 
profession—further attention to the role of sanctions is warranted. In many 
ways, disciplinary sanctions can be viewed as analogous to criminal sanctions, 
and professional responsibility scholars have looked to the vast criminal law 
literature in the area for guidance.244 
Yet there are important differences. Unlike criminal sanctions, discipli-
nary sanctions should not be grounded in retribution because the misconduct at 
issue is not necessarily morally blameworthy but rather professionally incom-
petent.245 To the extent that such conduct is simultaneously morally blamewor-
thy, it can be vindicated instead through the criminal justice system. By con-
trast, disciplinary sanctions should be forward-looking and directed toward the 
goal of ensuring that such misconduct not recur.246 Furthermore, disciplinary 
bodies rarely impose restitutionary sanctions and, in theory, aggrieved clients 
or third parties would be able to pursue restitution through civil proceedings.247 
This Article will focus instead on five goals to be served by sanctions: (1) 
specific deterrence, (2) general deterrence, (3) incapacitation, (4) rehabilita-
tion, and (5) expressions of disapproval. Sanctions that operate as specific de-
terrence will reduce the likelihood that the same practitioner will commit fu-
ture misconduct.248 Although in theory any type of sanction could operate as 
specific deterrence, sanctions that include the imposition of probation should 
lessen the likelihood that a practitioner will commit misconduct during the 
probationary period. To the extent that prior misconduct will be considered an 
                                                                                                                           
 243 See Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_
conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules/ [https://perma.cc/EVK9-KJ8C]; see also John S. 
Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules of Ethics, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 55, 57 
(2013) (noting the success of the ABA in creating rules that are uniformly adopted, but arguing that 
such rules have not kept up with changes in the profession). 
 244 See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 226, at 683. See generally Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Stand-
ards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2010) (applying criminal law con-
cepts to analyze and interpret lawyer disciplinary codes). 
 245 Zacharias, supra note 33, at 684. 
 246 Id. at 685–86. 
 247 See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1177 (1993). 
 248 Stephen G. Bené, Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Approach to Lawyer Disci-
plinary Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 907, 935 (1991). 
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aggravating factor in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, that fact could also 
serve to increase the deterrent effect on the practitioner.249 
Sanctions that operate as general deterrence do so by virtue of their effect 
on other practitioners, who are aware of the sanctions and conduct themselves 
in a manner to ensure that they do not end up suffering the same fate as the 
sanctioned practitioner.250 But the effectiveness of sanctions as general deter-
rence is subject to a number of considerations. First, such sanctions must be 
publicized in a way that other practitioners are made aware of them; otherwise, 
they cannot operate as a deterrence to others.251 Second, the deterrent effect of 
sanctions should not be viewed in isolation. The public is likely only aware of 
the infrequent, highly publicized cases, whereas lawyers themselves probably 
change their actions in reaction to more frequent and commonplace prosecu-
tions.252 Thus, it is the practitioner’s perception that he or she might likely face 
discipline that might deter him or her from committing misconduct, but such a 
perception will only be formed if the person is aware that a number of other 
practitioners have been disciplined for similar actions.253 
Incapacitating sanctions prevent practitioners from committing future 
misconduct because the sanction prohibits them from representing clients or 
otherwise engaging in the profession.254 The two types of incapacitating sanc-
tions are suspension and disbarment.255 Disbarment is termed “exclusion” 
when imposed by the USPTO.256 Although suspension generally lasts for a 
definite period of time,257 exclusion is theoretically permanent—subject to the 
practitioner successfully petitioning for reinstatement after a minimum period 
                                                                                                                           
 249 Compare Benjamin B. Sendor, The Relevance of Conduct and Character to Guilt and Pun-
ishment, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 99, 127 (1996) (noting that consideration of past 
acts is consistent with a specific deterrence theory), with Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad 
Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 1150 (2008) (calling into question the utility 
of aggravating factors as an effective deterrent). 
 250 See Bené, supra note 248, at 935. 
 251 See Levin, supra note 226, at 72. 
 252 Zacharias, supra note 33, at 729; see also Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When No-
body’s Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional 
Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 1005–06 (2002) (discussing effects of underenforcement on attorneys’ 
propensity to violate ethical rules). 
 253 Cf. Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 819 (2010) (applying the concept in the criminal context). 
 254 Bené, supra note 248, at 933–34; see DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 
956 (4th ed. 2004) (noting incapacitation as one of the predominant justifications for lawyer disci-
pline). 
 255 Kevin Hopkins, The Politics of Misconduct: Rethinking How We Regulate Lawyer-Politicians, 
57 RUTGERS L. REV. 839, 860 (2005). 
 256 35 U.S.C. § 32 (2018).  
 257 But see 37 C.F.R. § 11.25 (2019) (providing for interim suspensions that will last until there is 
an opportunity for a formal disciplinary proceeding). 
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of time, usually five years.258 Given the economic and professional impacts of 
incapacitating sanctions, they are to be limited to more egregious instances of 
practitioner misconduct.259 
As with incapacitating sanctions, rehabilitative sanctions are aimed to-
ward eliminating future misconduct, but they do so by imposing measures on 
the practitioner that promote ongoing conformity with the rules.260 Three 
common rehabilitative sanctions include probation (often with ongoing moni-
toring of client matters or funds), mandatory education in professional respon-
sibility, and mandatory mental health or chemical dependency treatment.261 
Often, these conditions are imposed in addition to more traditional sanctions 
and have become increasingly common even as rehabilitation has somewhat 
gone out of favor among criminal law theorists.262 
Unlike the aforementioned types of sanctions, an expressive sanction is 
one that primarily expresses disapproval of practitioner conduct rather than 
imposing significant limitations or conditions on a practitioner’s future profes-
sional activities.263 There are two primary types of expressive sanctions: the 
private warning (sometimes called an admonition or a warning letter) and the 
public reprimand.264 Whereas the former sends an expressive signal only to the 
disciplined practitioner, the latter may send a signal to other practitioners or to 
the public that such conduct is disapproved and, if repeated, could be subject to 
more severe sanction.265 
Of course, a particular sanction or set of sanctions could simultaneously 
serve multiple purposes. For example, a public reprimand could operate as 
specific deterrence (lessening the likelihood that the practitioner herself would 
commit future misconduct), as general deterrence (lessening the likelihood that 
other practitioners would commit similar types of misconduct in the future), 
and as an expressive signal that such conduct will not be condoned. That said, 
a sanction such as a public reprimand may have a stronger expressive effect 
than a deterrent effect. Part V will examine the imposition of USPTO sanctions 
in light of the degree to which they serve particular purposes.266 
                                                                                                                           
 258 Id. § 11.60(b) (“An excluded practitioner shall be eligible to apply for reinstatement no earlier 
than at least five years from the effective date of the exclusion.”). 
 259 Hopkins, supra note 255, at 860; Levin, supra note 226, at 21. 
 260 See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative 
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 299 (2012). 
 261 See Levin, supra note 226, at 24. 
 262 Id. at 23. 
 263 See id. at 22; cf. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
591, 602–03 (1996) (discussing the expressive character of sanctions in the context of criminal law). 
 264 The USPTO issues private warning letters. See 37 C.F.R. § 11.21 (2019). 
 265 See Levin, supra note 226, at 22–23. 
 266 See discussion infra Part V. 
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C. The USPTO Practice Setting 
In comparison to the practice of law in a particular state, which varies 
widely among its licensed attorneys, practice before the USPTO is considera-
bly more focused. This focus arguably should influence how the OED ap-
proaches practitioner discipline, in order to ensure that its work further pro-
motes the USPTO’s ultimate mission. 
As the federal gatekeeper for patent issuance and trademark registration, 
one of the USPTO’s primary responsibilities is ensuring accuracy while pro-
moting innovation and enterprise.267 With many determinations being made on 
an ex parte basis, the application process,268 substantive requirements,269 and 
USPTO Rules270 all highlight the overriding importance of the duty of candor 
and good faith in dealings with the Office. Even in the years during which the 
empirical study was conducted, the USPTO promulgated additional rules and 
revamped its application forms to impress upon practitioners the seriousness of 
these obligations.271 
Ultimately, the USPTO justifies its focus on candor as being linked to the 
fact that its decisions affect the public interest—not just the immediate appli-
cant’s rights, but those third parties that may rely on that recognition of intel-
lectual property rights in conducting their own affairs.272 Those third parties 
may include future competitors, who decline to use a particular mark for fear 
of infringing on a pre-existing registered trademark. It may include investors, 
who use the issuance of a patent as an official stamp of approval on the viabil-
ity of an invention. Viewed in this manner, protection of the public—broadly 
defined—is arguably paramount. Equally important, these third parties gener-
                                                                                                                           
 267 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2018–2022 STRATEGIC PLAN, at 2 (2018), https://
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO_2018-2022_Strategic_Plan.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Y3RX-DSTW]. The USPTO defines its mission as:  
fostering innovation, competitiveness and job growth in the United States by conduct-
ing high quality and timely patent and trademark examination and review proceedings 
in order to produce reliable and predictable intellectual property rights; guiding intellec-
tual property policy, and improving intellectual property rights protection; and deliver-
ing intellectual property information and education worldwide. 
Id. 
 268 See discussion supra Parts I.A and I.C. 
 269 See discussion supra Parts I.B and I.D. 
 270 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 271 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 42.51 (2019) (providing disclosure requirements); Amendments to the 
Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81 Fed. Reg. 18,750, 18,761 
(June 16, 2016) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42) (heightening disclosure requirements). 
 272 Iancu, Remarks at International Trademark Association, supra note 8; see Changes to Repre-
sentation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,178, 
20,184 (Apr. 3, 2013) (to be codified in scattered parts of 37 C.F.R.) (“All decisions made by the 
[USPTO] in patent and trademark matters affect the public interest.”). 
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ally are not participants in the prosecution process, for they have neither the 
relevant information nor the inclination to be involved at the early stages of an 
applicant’s commercial enterprise. 
With regard to the administration of justice, the USPTO has suggested 
that it is especially interested in ensuring that practitioners are responsive to 
inquiries from its employees, including the OED itself.273 Again, without the 
benefit of a true adversarial process, the USPTO simultaneously serves as de-
cisionmaker and healthy skeptic. Thus, it would be expected that its emphasis 
on the administration of justice be related to those activities that could thwart 
the ability of the USPTO to reach timely, impartial, and accurate decisions.274 
But what about instilling confidence in the profession? In contrast to the 
legal profession that is largely self-governing, USPTO practitioners do not 
regulate themselves. The disciplinary rules are initially enforced by USPTO 
employees, and the hearing officers are administrative law judges from a varie-
ty of fields. That separation should make it less likely that outsiders would 
view the system as a captured one—at least in comparison to the legal profes-
sion. Furthermore, although the popular media and general public sometimes 
have a low opinion of attorneys, that view is not especially prevalent when it 
comes to practitioners.275 That is not to say that the OED should ignore or 
overlook this purpose, but rather that this purpose may be secondary to the 
others discussed above. 
A final point to raise is the relationship between OED discipline and that 
which may be imposed by state disciplinary authorities. At least when it comes 
to practitioners who are also attorneys, there are certain types of misconduct 
that arguably seem as or better suited to be investigated by a state disciplinary 
authority rather than by the OED. Such examples could include criminal acts 
that may reflect poorly on the practitioner-attorney’s character and fitness but 
that do not have any direct connection to the subject matter of their practice 
                                                                                                                           
 273 See Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,193 (“A practitioner’s duty to cooperate fully with OED is vital to maintaining 
the integrity of the legal profession, which is an important duty owed by a practitioner to the public, 
the bar, the profession, and the Office.”). 
 274 See id. (“A practitioner’s compliance with the duty to cooperate has recently become even 
more essential to maintaining the integrity of the profession in light of the shorter statutory time al-
lowed for the OED Director to complete a full and fair investigation of a practitioner’s alleged mis-
conduct.”). 
 275 See, e.g., LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW 6–8 (4th ed. 2016) (presenting public opinion data indicating that public perception of attorneys 
is low); Honesty/Ethics in Professions, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-
professions.aspx [https://perma.cc/X5N7-FZ6Q] (finding that 22% of the American public rate the 
honesty and ethical standards of lawyers as “Very High” or “High,” and 28% rate lawyers’ standards 
as “Low or Very Low”). These ratings are lower than those for nurses, medical doctors, police offic-
ers, and bankers. Honesty/Ethics in Professions, supra. 
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before the USPTO. Even client trust account violations, although indirectly 
related to attorneys’ USPTO practice, are quite likely more pervasive than 
among their trademark or patent clients (assuming that their practice is not so 
limited). By contrast, the OED would be the optimal disciplinary authority to 
investigate practitioners who have improper relationships with non-
practitioners in prosecuting patents, prosecute fraudulent applications, or vio-
late USPTO-specific rules such as the duty of disclosure. 
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF USPTO PRACTITIONER DISCIPLINE 
With this theoretical foundation in place, this Article now turns to the criti-
cal practical question of how the OED is carrying out its responsibility to mete 
out discipline. To address this question, a comprehensive study was conducted of 
all public discipline imposed on practitioners between January 1, 2003, and De-
cember 31, 2018. This Part begins with a discussion of the methodology em-
ployed, including the rationale behind the strategic coding and analytical deci-
sions made.276 It then presents the results of the study and the implications that 
may be drawn, first for USPTO practitioners as a whole and then specifically 
comparing and contrasting the discipline imposed on patent and trademark 
practitioners.277 It concludes with a discussion of the ethics rules that form the 
basis of discipline, identifying four common patterns of misconduct and the 
inferences that might be made about the OED’s work and current focus.278 
A. Methodology 
To evaluate the imposition of USPTO discipline, it was necessary first to 
compile all disciplinary actions for the time period of interest. The USPTO 
provides access to all decisions from disciplinary hearings through the OED 
Reading Room, a searchable database that compiles information online pursu-
ant to the Freedom of Information Act.279 In addition to disciplinary orders, the 
OED Reading Room contains a number of decisions related to practitioner 
admission that could be a fruitful topic for additional research.280 
Initially, this project isolated only those disciplinary orders that were cat-
egorized as “Final Decision” or “Final Order,” because the USPTO website 
                                                                                                                           
 276 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 277 See discussion infra Parts V.B and V.C. 
 278 See discussion infra Part V.D. 
 279 FOIA Documents, supra note 163. 
 280 Id.; see, e.g., In re Graham, No. D2013-09, at 3–4 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office July 17, 
2013) (final order) (ordering respondent’s suspension and describing steps he must take prior to rein-
statement to practice before the USPTO). 
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suggested that those designations would capture all disciplinary actions.281 But 
this was under-inclusive, as there were a large number of documents labeled 
“Initial Decision” that did not include a corresponding “Final Decision.”282 In 
inspecting those later documents, the reason became clear: each included lan-
guage that the disciplined practitioner had thirty days to appeal the initial deci-
sion or else it would become a final decision. Accordingly, those decisions—
the vast majority of which were default judgments—were included. There 
were also some decisions that were labeled in unconventional ways, such as 
“Memorandum and Order” or “Judgment.”283 Each of those was reviewed fur-
ther to determine whether it should be considered a final judgment on disci-
pline and categorized accordingly. 
Once the complete set of disciplinary orders was retrieved, all were man-
ually reviewed to determine whether they should be included in the dataset. 
Each document is titled in the following manner: “D[YEAR]-XX.”284 The year 
appears to generally correspond to the year in which the investigation was 
opened. Seven decisions corresponded to a year earlier than 2003 but these 
decisions were still included in the analysis because state disciplinary authori-
ties likewise report their activities according to the year of decision and in-
clude any cases originating in an earlier year.285 
There were two types of discipline that were excluded from the analysis. 
First, there were twelve disciplinary orders that imposed an interim suspen-
sion, which is imposed when a practitioner has been convicted of a serious 
crime.286 In those instances, the practitioner is then referred to a formal disci-
plinary proceeding based on the same misconduct, and thus there should be 
                                                                                                                           
 281 See Finding a Patent Practitioner, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.
uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/patent-and-trademark-practitioners/finding-patent-practitioner 
[https://perma.cc/5PYB-33HX] (“For information about practitioners who have been disciplined, 
search OED Final Decisions in the FOIA Reading Room.”). 
 282 See, e.g., In re Robinson, No. D2009-48 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office July 1, 2010) 
(providing an example of an “Initial Decision” without a corresponding “Final Decision”). 
 283 See, e.g., In re Myers, No. D2015-33 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Dec. 31, 2015) 
(providing an example of a decision labeled as a “Judgment”); In re Halvonik, No. D2006-15 (U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office Jan. 21, 2009) (providing an example of a decision labeled as a “Memo-
randum and Order”). 
 284 See FOIA Documents, supra note 163. 
 285 See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, AM. BAR ASS’N, 2015 SURVEY ON LAW-
YER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS 5–7 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional_responsibility/2015_sold_results.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7VP-N45V] (listing the number 
of ethics complaints pending from prior years). There were two decisions from investigations that 
began in 1999, one from 2000, two from 2001, and two from 2002. 
 286 See 37 C.F.R. § 11.25 (2019) (providing for interim suspension and discipline based on con-
viction of a serious crime). 
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later disciplinary actions that cover the misconduct at issue in these orders.287 
Second, there were four disciplinary orders in which practitioners were trans-
ferred to inactive status on account of a disability that rendered them incapable 
to practice law.288 Though styled as a “disciplinary action,” these orders do not 
fall within the aim of this study and were excluded. 
After this scrubbing was completed, each order was read and coded ac-
cording to the type of practitioner who had been disciplined, i.e. patent agent, 
patent attorney, or trademark attorney. But of course, some lawyers prosecute 
both patents and trademarks, and the misconduct at issue might involve one or 
both of their practices. Accordingly, each order was coded by the practice ar-
ea(s) in which the misconduct had occurred and whether the practitioner was 
an attorney at the time of the proceeding.289 In cases of reciprocal discipline, 
practitioners were coded according to their practice area(s) rather than the are-
as in which the underlying misconduct occurred, unless it was clear that the 
underlying misconduct was in fact related to one or both practice areas. 
In addition to other variables related to the disciplinary process itself (for 
example, whether the practitioner had responded or entered into a settlement 
agreement), each order was coded according to the disciplinary rule(s) violat-
ed, sanction type, sanction length, and whether additional conditions had been 
imposed.290 Finally, a summary of the relevant misconduct was prepared in 
order to better elucidate some of the frequently occurring fact patterns in disci-
plinary cases. 
Of the 410 “public” disciplinary orders in the final set, five practitioners 
received a “private” reprimand.291 These orders removed any identifying prac-
titioner information but still provided insight into the misconduct at issue. In 
the analysis that follows, these orders are combined with the public reprimands 
when considered collectively but specifically identified when relevant to un-
derstanding the “public” nature of discipline imposed on a specific practitioner. 
To contextualize the frequency and severity of USPTO discipline, a sepa-
rate dataset was compiled of lawyer discipline by state authorities using infor-
mation published by the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline. 
                                                                                                                           
 287 See id. § 11.25(b)(5) (“Upon entering a final order imposing interim suspension, the USPTO 
Director shall refer the complaint to a hearing officer to conduct a formal disciplinary proceeding.”). 
 288 See id. § 11.20(c) (providing for transfer to disability inactive status). 
 289 For patent disciplinary actions, individuals were denoted as an attorney if they were designat-
ed “patent attorney” or if the order stated that the individual was licensed to practice law. 
 290 Orders imposing suspensions required additional attention, as a significant number of them 
immediately stayed the suspension and instead put the practitioner on probation. For these orders, 
both the suspension and alternative disposition were captured. 
 291 See, e.g., In re [Anonymous], No. D2006-17, at 3 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Apr. 30, 
2007) (final order) (stating that a patent attorney had reached a settlement agreement whereby they 
would be privately reprimanded). 
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Each year, this committee releases results from the Survey of Lawyer Disci-
pline (ABA SOLD), which is completed by nearly all state lawyer disciplinary 
authorities.292 When necessary, the study was supplemented with additional 
data sources noted in the following analysis. 
To provide an accurate comparison of the frequency of discipline among 
different disciplinary authorities, it was necessary to identify the number of 
practitioners or lawyers who were subject to such discipline. Although the 
ABA SOLD contains that information for each reporting state, there is no read-
ily available comparable data for USPTO practitioners. The OED shares cur-
rent information on the number of “active” patent practitioners, but there is no 
historical repository containing those numbers.293 Nevertheless, an estimate for 
patent practitioners was constructed based on several known years of data and 
the corresponding trends in the patent practitioner population.294 
An estimate was even harder to develop for trademark attorneys, because 
the OED has no registration process or other methods for identifying who is 
subject to its jurisdiction. The USPTO does compile historical data on each 
trademark application, which may include the name of the attorney who is 
prosecuting it.295 This field required considerable scrubbing, however, because 
many of the “names” are not in fact names of attorneys at all.296 After this data 
was scrubbed, attorneys were considered active for a particular year if they had 
prosecuted a trademark application sometime within the prior three calendar 
years. From there, the number of active attorneys was calculated for each year 
during the time period of interest. 
                                                                                                                           
 292 See STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, AM. BAR ASS’N, 2016 SURVEY ON LAWYER 
DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/pro-
fessional_responsibility/2016sold_results.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSH9-S96F] (providing the results of 
the 2016 survey); see also Historical ABA S.O.L.D. Surveys, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.american
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/historicalabasoldsurveys/ [https://perma.cc/3EZ6-
HX84] (providing links to previous surveys from 1998 to 2016). Although survey data from 2003 to 
2016 are available, estimates for 2017 and 2018 have been created by using a combination of the five 
year average and annual trend. For example, if the five year average was 100 but there had been a 20 
point decrease during each year, the following year would be estimated at 80. 
 293 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 294 The number of active patent practitioners was available for five of the sixteen years. These 
numbers were used as a starting point for constructing the estimate of active practitioners, with ad-
justments for the changes in the number of known patent application filings. 
 295 See Trademark Case Files Dataset, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.
gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/trademark-case-files-dataset-0 [https://perma.cc/
ND8D-K9K3] (containing the research datasets along with documents describing the data). See gen-
erally Graham et al., supra note 93 (providing trademark application data). 
 296 Many of the entries in this field were not names, but rather numbers or parts of addresses (e.g., 
WI 53202-4910). These were removed from the analysis, as it was unclear whether the application 
had been filed by an attorney and, in these cases, the identity of the attorney was also unclear. 
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B. Overall Results 
As an initial matter, the frequency of practitioner discipline was calculated 
over time. Although the OED publicly disciplined twenty-six practitioners 
on average each year between 2003 and 2018, there was an upward trend 
over that timeframe. But, as Figure I illustrates, that trend was irregular and 
inconsistent, particularly with the large spike in disciplinary actions (fifty) 
in 2010. 
Figure I: OED-Imposed Public Discipline by Year 
Additional analysis sheds some insight on one reason for the disparity: 
reciprocal discipline. As Part II.C explained, the OED is vigilant in its imposi-
tion of reciprocal discipline for attorneys disciplined by another state bar au-
thority. Figures II and III below demonstrate how reciprocal discipline shapes 
and impacts the OED’s work. It comprises nearly half of all public discipline 
imposed, and over two-thirds (23/34) of the discipline in 2018. Likewise, alt-
hough there were fifty practitioners who received public discipline in 2010, 
only twenty of those were actually the result of an OED investigation and the 
rest were reciprocal discipline cases. 
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Figure II. Composition of OED Public Discipline 
Figure III. USPTO and Reciprocal Discipline by Year 
Although the small numbers of disciplinary actions suggest that the OED 
does not seem to frequently impose discipline, the question arises of how these 
numbers might compare to other disciplinary authorities—is the OED disci-
plining fewer practitioners than its state counterparts? Figure IV below demon-
strates that it is indeed imposing less discipline, even though there has been a 
significant increase in practitioner discipline over the sixteen-year time period 
coupled with an overall decline in state attorney discipline during that same 
time frame. 
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Figure IV. Imposition of Public Discipline (per 10,000 Active Practitioners) 
On average over the sixteen years studied, just 4.0 out of every 10,000 
practitioners were subject to public discipline by the OED, in comparison to 
26.9 attorneys from their respective state authorities. Even this statistic overin-
flates OED discipline, because 45% of those were in fact reciprocal discipline 
already included among the state disciplinary statistics. Although there has 
been a general upward trend in OED discipline relative to state discipline, it 
has remained between 4.6 and 5.1 practitioners per 10,000 since 2015—a rate 
that is less than one-fourth of the rate of state discipline during that time. 
Figures V and VI provide further insight into the relative distribution of 
public sanctions imposed, as well as the frequency of alternative dispositions. 
At first glance, these two figures may seem somewhat contradictory. On the 
one hand, the OED imposes relatively more punitive sanctions than its state 
counterparts. On the other hand, the OED imposes considerably more private 
discipline and terms of probation. 
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Figure V: Type of Public Sanction Imposed 
Figure VI: Other Sanctions 
But taken together, a theme begins to emerge in terms of the purposes 
these sanctions serve. Each of the heavily imposed USPTO sanctions furthers 
the goal of specific deterrence, in that they are limited to the knowledge of the 
practitioner (private warnings), they ensure that the practitioner conforms his 
or her future conduct to the USPTO Rules (probation), or they incapacitate a 
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practitioner who cannot conform his or her conduct to the USPTO Rules (ex-
clusion, and to a lesser extent, suspension).297 
At the same time, USPTO sanctioning practice does not appear to priori-
tize the goals of general deterrence or expressiveness to the same extent.298 As 
a general matter, the practitioner population will not know of the prevalence of 
private sanctions—indeed, it is not even published on the USPTO website—
and it certainly will not learn of the specific conduct which led to it. Likewise, 
the existence of relatively few public reprimands means that the practitioner 
population will not learn of many examples in the mid-level category of mis-
conduct falling below that which would operate as a suspension. This circum-
stance, coupled with the low number of disciplinary actions overall, means that 
practitioners have little available guidance on the boundaries of permissible 
conduct in their USPTO practice. 
C. Comparing the Discipline of Patent and Trademark Practitioners 
Although the preceding Section sheds some light on the degree to which 
the OED is using its disciplinary function to regulate practitioner conduct, it is 
only the beginning of the story. As was described in Parts II and III, patent and 
trademark practitioners are not situated similarly in relation to the USPTO. 
Whereas patent practitioners must satisfy several requirements to become reg-
istered, attorneys who wish to practice before the USPTO need only find will-
ing clientele and they can begin a trademark prosecution practice. Moreover, 
there is a marked difference between the two in the way that the USPTO com-
municates practitioners’ obligations. The patent practitioners’ duty of candor 
and possible sanctions upon violation are well-known, but the same is not true 
for the obligations imposed on trademark attorneys.299 This Section explores 
whether that distinction carries through to the OED’s work, despite the fact 
that ostensibly it regulates both sets of practitioners in the same manner. 
Figures VII and VIII below reveal the staggering differences in patent and 
trademark discipline, showing that 77% of all public disciplinary actions in-
volve those who prosecute patents. Though there has been a slight increase in 
the discipline of trademark attorneys since 2014, that trend is nearly compara-
ble for patent practitioners as well. In 2018, for instance, only 32% (11/34) of 
all disciplinary actions involved trademark practice alone. 
                                                                                                                           
 297 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 298 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 299 See discussion supra Parts II.B and II.D. 
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Figure VII: OED Discipline Frequency by Practice Area 
Figure VIII: OED Discipline by Practice Area Over Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figures IX and X below demonstrate that these differences cannot be ful-
ly explained by the disparities in the sizes of the practitioner populations or in 
the number of USPTO applications filed. 
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Figure IX: Imposition of Public Discipline (per 10,000 Active Practitioners) 
Figure X: Imposition of Public Discipline (per 100,000 Application Filings) 
Even when accounting for the larger pool of patent practitioners or the 
larger number of patent applications filed, there is still a significant difference 
between trademark and patent practices in regard to discipline.300 In fact, dur-
 
300 During the relevant time period, there were averages of 497,004 patent filings and 407,152 
trademark filings each year. That gap has been narrowing, however, with 643,349 patent filings and 
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ing the three-year period between 2006 and 2008, there were no disciplinary 
actions based on trademark practice alone—an astonishing statistic. These fig-
ures should not necessarily suggest that patent practitioners are unduly targeted 
or over-represented; a quick comparison between Figure VIII and Figure IV 
indicates that they are subject to less discipline by the OED than are attorneys 
by their respective state authorities. Rather, these figures seem to indicate that 
trademark attorneys are significantly under-represented among those receiving 
discipline. Although discipline for both types of practices is trending upward, 
the increase is neither steep nor consistent across the time period. 
Figure XI presents the frequency with which different types of sanctions 
are imposed on practitioners in the two practice areas.301 It demonstrates that 
trademark practitioners receive less punitive sanctions than their patent coun-
terparts. Figure XII provides additional detail on the length of suspensions for 
each group. 
Figure XI: Type of Sanction by Practice Area 
 
638,847 trademark filings in 2018. With regards to practitioners, there was an estimated average of 
41,213 patent practitioners, as compared to 32,198 trademark practitioners. The gap between the two 
widened to 13,590 in 2018. 
 301 Figure XI and the figures that follow exclude reciprocal discipline cases because the OED 
does not play a role in determining the type of sanction imposed by the initiating state. 
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Figure XII: Average Length of Suspension (in Months) by Practice Area 
Several trends emerge. First, it is clear that the most severe sanctions are 
imposed among those practitioners in the “both” category. That result is not 
surprising, however, once one considers how that category is constructed; by 
definition, the proscribed misconduct included both patent and trademark 
prosecution. Given the inherently larger scope of misconduct, it would be ex-
pected that the corresponding sanctions would be more punitive on average. 
Comparing patent- and trademark-only practitioners, patent practitioners have 
a higher representation among each of the more severe incapacitating sanctions 
(involuntary exclusion, exclusion on consent, suspension), whereas trademark 
practitioners are much more likely to receive a reprimand. 
Patent practitioners also serve longer suspensions on average than their 
trademark counterparts. Though there is not comprehensive statewide data 
available on this subject,302 available evidence suggests that patent practition-
ers are likely serving even longer suspensions than they would have, had the 
sanction been imposed by a state authority.303 Once again, those practitioners 
 
302 Notably, the ABA Survey on Lawyer Discipline does not require states to provide information 
on the average length of suspensions; such data could be beneficial to an understanding of this issue. 
See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, supra note 292, at 1. 
 303 See Patricia W. Hatamyar & Kevin M. Simmons, Are Women More Ethical Lawyers? An 
Empirical Study, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 785, 820 (2004) (finding an 11.26-month mean term of sus-
pension and six month median term of suspension for attorneys, with statistically significant differ-
ences by gender). 
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committing misconduct across both practice areas are receiving the longest 
suspensions on average. 
D. Ethics Rules Violated by USPTO Practitioners 
Given the differences between patent and trademark practice, along with 
the disparity between the two in terms of the types of discipline imposed, one 
would expect there to be corresponding differences between the two in regard 
to the number and types of ethics rules that are cited as providing the basis for 
discipline. Figure XIII provides the number of ethics rules cited in all public 
disciplinary orders, and Figure XIV further calculates the average number of 
rules cited for each practice area. 
Figure XIII: Number of Ethics Rules Cited in Disciplinary Orders 
Figure XIV: Number of Ethics Rules Cited by Practice Area 
  Mean Rules Cited Median Rules Cited 
Overall 3.5 3 
Patent 3.2 3 
Trademark 3.6 4 
Both 5.6 5 
As Figure XIII indicates, more than eighty percent of USPTO disciplinary 
actions cited two or more ethics rules that provided the basis for discipline. 
Unexpectedly, trademark disciplinary cases cite more ethics rules on average 
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than do patent cases (3.6 vs. 3.2), even though the former lead to less severe 
sanctions on average.304 
This mismatch between the number of rule violations and severity of 
sanctions may contribute to the perception among patent practitioners that they 
must be wary of the threat of OED investigation. Even a cursory Internet 
search reveals a number of articles and blog posts about patent practitioner 
discipline and best practices to avoid getting in trouble.305 The same is not true 
for trademark discipline, about which there is little discussion. 
Armed with the knowledge that most OED disciplinary actions implicate 
more than one ethics rule, this Section now turns to the more nuanced question 
of what types of misconduct give rise to disciplinary actions. Figure XV pre-
sents an initial picture using the categories identified in Part III.C, both for the 
overall practitioner population and by practice area. The number under the la-
bel in parentheses corresponds to the number of disciplinary actions in that 
category. 
Figure XV: Ethics Rules Cited as Source of OED Discipline 
Misconduct  
Category 
Overall 
(221) 
Patent 
(174) 
Trademark 
(23) 
Both 
(24) 
Diligence 45.7% 44.3% 34.8% 66.7% 
General  
Misrepresentation 
44.3% 40.8% 43.5% 70.8% 
Administration  
of Justice 
40.3% 35.6% 47.8% 66.7% 
General Unfitness  
to Practice 
35.3% 36.2% 26.1% 37.5% 
Communication 29.4% 26.4% 21.7% 58.3% 
Client Property  
and Accounting 
21.3% 21.3% 8.7% 33.3% 
Competence 14.9% 11.5% 17.4% 37.5% 
Criminal Acts 12.7% 14.9% 4.3% 4.2% 
Cooperation  
with OED 
12.2% 10.9% 8.7% 25.0% 
Assisting Unau-
thorized Practice 
11.8% 5.7% 26.1% 41.7% 
Termination Issues 10.9% 9.2% 8.7% 25.0% 
Truthfulness  10.0% 8.0% 13.0% 20.8% 
                                                                                                                           
 304 See discussion supra Part V.C. 
 305 See, e.g., Michael E. McCabe, Jr., This Post Could Save Your Patent Law License, MCCABE 
LAW (June 1, 2017), https://www.ipethicslaw.com/this-post-could-save-your-patent-law-license/ [https://
perma.cc/5X48-7ME8] (discussing administrative suspensions of patent practitioners at the USPTO). 
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Misconduct  
Category 
Overall 
(221) 
Patent 
(174) 
Trademark 
(23) 
Both 
(24) 
to USPTO 
Conflict of Interest 9.5% 8.6% 17.4% 8.3% 
Improper Influence 
by Third Party 
9.0% 9.2% 13.0% 4.2% 
Relationship with 
Non-Practitioner 
8.1% 7.5% 17.4% 4.2% 
Fairness to Oppos-
ing Parties 
6.3% 5.7% 4.3% 12.5% 
Fees 5.4% 6.3% 0.0% 4.2% 
Scope of  
Representation 
4.5% 4.6% 4.3% 4.2% 
False Advertising 4.5% 2.3% 13.0% 12.5% 
Violation of Rules 
Through Others 
3.2% 2.9% 4.3% 4.2% 
Confidentiality 2.3% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Reporting  
Misconduct 
1.8% 1.1% 4.3% 4.2% 
Improper Oversight 
of Non-Practitioner 
1.8% 0.6% 4.3% 8.3% 
Improper Business 
Transactions with 
Client 
1.4% 1.1% 4.3% 0.0% 
Limitation of Lia-
bility 
0.9% 0.6% 0.0% 4.2% 
Gov’t Employee  
Conflict 
0.9% 0.6% 4.3% 0.0% 
Candid Advice 0.9% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Truthfulness to  
Others 
0.5% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
Ex Parte  
Communications 
0.5% 0.0% 4.3% 0.0% 
Improper Advertis-
ing 
0.5% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
Improper Solicita-
tion 
0.5% 0.0% 4.3% 0.0% 
After diligence, which is the most prevalent ethics rule that forms the ba-
sis of discipline (45.7%), the next three most frequently cited provisions are all 
part of the general misconduct rule—misrepresentation (44.3%), actions that 
are prejudicial to the administration of justice (40.3%), and actions that reflect 
adversely on one’s fitness to practice before the USPTO (35.3%). This is nota-
ble, in part because there is criticism among some ethics scholars about the 
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over-reliance on these provisions by state disciplinary authorities together with 
the difficulty for practitioners to understand what types of misconduct are sub-
ject to these rules.306 Indeed, as mentioned in Part III.B, the ABA Rules elimi-
nated the “fitness to practice” provision on account of these concerns.307 
These concerns are especially salient when it comes to USPTO practice. 
The USPTO purports to give heightened attention to misconduct related to the 
duties of candor and good faith and yet there are relatively few disciplinary 
actions related to that type of misconduct. As Figure XV demonstrates, the eth-
ics provisions that are most clearly linked to these duties—truthfulness toward 
the USPTO (the twelfth most frequently cited), fairness to opposing parties 
(the sixteenth most frequently cited), and confidentiality (the twenty-first most 
frequently cited)—all rank outside of the top ten most frequently cited rules. 
Although there is some variation between trademark and patent practices, 
these statistics must be interpreted with caution given the small number of 
trademark cases in the dataset (twenty-three). So, despite the fact that there are 
relatively more trademark cases which cite truthfulness in actions toward the 
USPTO as the source of misconduct (13% versus 10% overall), that rule only 
appears in a total of three trademark cases over the entire sixteen-year time 
period. 
Figure XVI provides further insight into the interrelationship between the 
top ten ethics rules cited, in order to begin to identify typical patterns of mis-
conduct that give rise to disciplinary actions. Each cell contains the Pearson 
correlation coefficient between the two ethics rules, with statistically signifi-
cant correlations denoted by one (significant at .05 level) or two (significant at 
.01 level) stars. All correlations above .200 have been highlighted as well. The 
strongest correlation is between diligence and communication, which is very 
high at .504. 
                                                                                                                           
 306 See discussion supra Part III.B and note 227. 
 307 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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Figure XVI: Correlations Between Top 10 Cited Ethics Rules 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using these correlations as a starting point, this Article identifies and de-
scribes four commonly observed patterns of misconduct that simultaneously 
implicate strongly correlated rules. This is the first such categorization in the 
scholarly literature, which could be replicated for other disciplinary authorities 
in the future. Each category is described in further detail below. 
1. The Financial Fool 
One of the most frequent patterns of misconduct leading to OED disci-
pline involves practitioners who submit fee payments to the USPTO that are 
dishonored for insufficient funds, often triggering violations of the diligence 
and client property/accounting provisions. These disciplinary actions are near-
ly exclusively limited to patent practitioners due to various filing fees that 
must be submitted over the course of the life of a patent; the most common 
sanctions for violations include public reprimands and term suspensions.308 
In re Guth in 2011 is paradigmatic of these disciplinary actions.309 The 
OED received information from the USPTO Office of Finance that Guth had 
issued ten checks that were dishonored due to insufficient funds. This infor-
                                                                                                                           
 308 See, e.g., In re King, No. D2015-29, at 6–11 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office May 26, 
2015) (final order) (ordering a public reprimand for eleven dishonored electronic and check payments 
to USPTO); In re Perkowski, No. D2011-11, at 3–4 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office June 17, 
2011) (final order) (ordering a two-year suspension, stayed pursuant to settlement agreement, for 
eighteen dishonored checks). 
 309 See No. D2010-37 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Feb. 11, 2011) (final order). 
2020] An Empirical Study of Patent and Trademark Discipline 1673 
mation triggered an OED investigation that revealed a number of mishandled 
transactions and patent applications that were under threat of abandonment due 
to Guth’s financial neglect. Guth’s actions were the result of poor accounting 
practices, and he undertook remedial action and cooperated with the OED in-
vestigation to mitigate his misconduct. Pursuant to a settlement agreement, 
Guth received a two-year suspension that was stayed and replaced by a two-
year probation.310 
2. The Overcommitted Practitioner 
Another common scenario giving rise to discipline is where an experi-
enced practitioner begins neglecting a series of applications, apparently be-
cause the practitioner is overcommitted. They start missing deadlines,311 cut-
ting corners,312 and leaving the client out of the communications loop.313 Even-
tually these actions come to light, often by a client who asks about the status of 
an abandoned application.314 At this point, the more ethical practitioners will 
reveal the misconduct and attempt to ameliorate it.315 But the less scrupulous 
will attempt to cover up their mistakes with lies—first to their client and some-
times even to the OED.316 These cases regularly involve violations of the dili-
gence and communication provisions and sometimes will include misrepresen-
tations to their clients and the OED. 
In re Fuess in 2017 exemplifies one of the more extreme scenarios.317 
Over thirty-six years of active patent practice, Fuess had prosecuted more than 
three hundred applications and had no disciplinary history prior to 2008. At 
that time, he neglected ten separate patent applications for four clients, which 
ultimately led to abandonment. Several of these applications were for one of 
his longstanding clients, who eventually confronted him about them and even-
                                                                                                                           
 310 See id. 
 311 See, e.g., In re Matlock, No. D2011-52, at 2 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Feb. 7, 2012) 
(final order) (noting that the respondent missed several deadlines and claimed that “his firm had staff-
ing problems” at the time of the neglect). 
 312 See id. (rejecting respondent’s claim that he made a timely response and noting that the 
USPTO did not receive any such response). 
 313 See, e.g., In re Shaffer, No. D2014-18, at 2 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office July 31, 2014) 
(final order) (finding that respondent abandoned several trademark applications and failed to inform 
clients of the status of their applications). 
 314 See, e.g., In re Fuess, No. D2015-08, at 7 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office July 21, 2017) 
(initial decision and order) (describing how respondent faced discipline after a client inquired about 
the status of their abandoned application). 
 315 See, e.g., In re Lahser, No. D2016-27, at 4, 6 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office June 3, 2016) 
(final order) (suspending practitioner for twelve months, mitigated by the fact that the practitioner 
voluntarily made restitution to the client and cooperated with OED). 
 316 In re Fuess, No. D2015-08, at 7. 
 317 Id. 
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tually replaced him with another practitioner. Fuess repeatedly shaded the 
truth, first blaming it on the USPTO and eventually providing responses to the 
OED in which he misrepresented the nature of his relationships with clients 
and their wishes. Fuess received a three-year suspension from patent practice, 
justified in part by the breadth of his neglect and misrepresentations.318 The 
initial hearing decision specifically noted that this misconduct was likely the 
result of Fuess’s burgeoning patent docket.319 
Unlike the financial fool, the overwhelmed practitioner may be a patent or 
trademark practitioner—though the vast majority of disciplinary actions in this 
category involve patent practice.320 The sanctions also vary widely, with a 
larger percentage of public reprimands and shorter suspensions among those 
practitioners who neglect fewer applications and/or are fully responsive to the 
client and OED inquiries.321 
3. The Absent Advocate 
Similar to the overwhelmed practitioner, the absent advocate neglects one 
or more client matters—but they do so by wholly failing to communicate, ei-
ther with or on behalf of clients.322 Invariably their non-responsiveness contin-
ues even after they become subject to an OED inquiry, which exacerbates their 
misconduct and leads to more punitive sanctions.323 This category includes 
those who practice patent or trademark law and they often receive sanctions in 
the form of suspensions and occasionally exclusions.324 Among the cited rule 
violations are failure to cooperate with the OED, failure to communicate, and 
failure to return unearned client funds. 
                                                                                                                           
 318 Id. 
 319 See id. at 68 (“As the reasons Respondent offered for the neglect were not credible, the Direc-
tor suggests that the reasons Respondent neglected the applications might be that he was overwhelmed 
with work . . . .”). 
 320 See, e.g., In re Shaffer, No. 2014-18, at 2–6 (disciplining a trademark practitioner). 
 321 See, e.g., In re Hill, No. D2001-06, at 11 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office July 26, 2004) 
(final decision) (reprimanding an attorney who neglected patent applications due to a firm docketing 
system, in part because “Respondent owned up to the errors of his own volition, filed petitions to 
revive in time to prevent any appreciable harm to his client, and paid the full costs associated with 
these petitions, approximately $20,000, out of his own pocket without prodding or debate”). 
 322 See, e.g., In re Schaefer, No. D2007-01, at 1–2 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Apr. 30, 
2007) (final order) (failing to prosecute a number of applications and communicate with clients or the 
USPTO). 
 323 See, e.g., In re Hill, No. D2014-41, at 11–16 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Feb. 19, 
2015) (initial decision on default) (failing to respond, in part or in whole, to multiple RFIs from the 
OED). 
 324 See id. 
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In re Dao in 2015 illustrates this category of misconduct for a practitioner 
who prosecutes both patent and trademark applications.325 After filing three 
patent applications for three clients and two trademark applications for another 
client, Dao became completely unresponsive to office actions and failed to 
maintain client communications. He also continued to prosecute trademark 
applications—and failed to inform the USPTO—when he was administratively 
suspended from the practice of law by a state disciplinary authority.326 When 
the OED sent an RFI and multiple follow up notices, Dao did not respond for 
six months. Though he eventually provided a response, he did not provide a 
reason for his prolonged unresponsiveness. Eventually, Dao entered into a set-
tlement agreement with the OED under which he would serve a six-month 
suspension from USPTO practice.327 
4. Patent Mill Participants 
Whereas the preceding categories are not unique to USPTO practice, the 
patent mill is necessarily limited to patent practice. Although there are some 
variations in their structure, most patent mills employ very few patent practi-
tioners and have a larger number of non-practitioners who conduct nearly all 
work for the organization.328 The practitioners have little to no contact with the 
inventor clients, relying on the non-practitioners to assist clients in navigating 
the patent application process.329 The patent mills’ services are widely adver-
tised to prospective clients who are relatively unfamiliar with patent prosecu-
tion, and they leverage this fact—often along with unfounded claims of suc-
cess—to acquire a large client base.330 These cases involve violations of com-
petence, the relationship with non-practitioners, and the general misconduct 
provisions. 
World Patent Marketing (WPM) was one of the more notorious patent 
mills.331 Its fraudulent practices were uncovered by a disgruntled customer in 
                                                                                                                           
 325 No. D2015-23, at 4 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office May 15, 2015) (final order). 
 326 Id. at 3. 
 327 Id. at 5. 
 328 See, e.g., In re Colitz, Jr., No. D1999-04, at 1–2 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Jan. 2, 
2003) (final decision) (committing misconduct through the Invention Submission Corporation, Na-
tional Idea Network, and American Inventors Corporation, three invention development companies). 
 329 See id. at 32. 
 330 See, e.g., In re Montgomery, No. D2018-02, at 13 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Jan. 10, 
2018) (final order) (“Respondent understood the general lack of sophistication of his clients, but nei-
ther Respondent nor [Montgomery Patent & Design, L.P.] ever explained to inventors the likelihood 
that the inventor would receive a patent of ‘useful scope,’ as described on [the Montgomery family 
businesses’] websites, if they pursued provisional, design, or utility patent protection.”). 
 331 See Carol D. Leonnig et al., Whitaker Fielded Early Fraud Complaints from Customers at 
Patent Company Even as He Championed It, Records Show, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2018), https://
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conjunction with an undercover Federal Trade Commission investigation. The 
company’s sole registered patent practitioner, Marina Mikhailova, filed more 
than 400 patent applications under her registration number.332 Not surprisingly, 
Mikhailova did little work on the applications, relying without question on the 
assertions of non-practitioner employees without verifying the details of the fil-
ings or directly communicating with clients. As a WPM employee, she received 
all her compensation from the company and did not address the conflicts issues 
that inherently arose.333 Once the OED investigation began, however, she was 
extremely cooperative, acknowledging her misconduct and agreeing to serve a 
twenty-month suspension.334 Scott Cooper, the CEO of WPM, has been banned 
by the FTC from running an invention promotion business and forced to pay $1 
million.335 A criminal investigation is also underway.336 
Taken together, these four categories of misconduct illustrate some of the 
most common types of misconduct that lead to OED investigations and public 
discipline. But it must be remembered that almost half of all disciplinary ac-
tions do not originate with the USPTO; rather, they are the result of the imposi-
tion of reciprocal discipline.337 Three of these categories—the financial fool, 
overwhelmed practitioner, and absent advocate—are not unique to USPTO 
practice and are easily detectable in that they leave a trail of dishonored 
checks, abandoned applications, and irate clients in their wake. Although pa-
tent mills do not inherently lead to substandard results, they are structured in 
such a way that some percentage of their clients will be dissatisfied with their 
work.338 Eventually, one or more of these clients may contact the USPTO and 
trigger an OED investigation. 
Although it is important for the OED to continue to investigate and disci-
pline practitioners who fall into one of the preceding categories, they only repre-
                                                                                                                           
wapo.st/3chIZLl [https://perma.cc/39QL-3TJ7] (reporting on the WPM scam that was made even 
more famous by the implication that the acting U.S. Attorney General was involved). 
 332 In re Mikhailova, No. D2017-18, at 2 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office June 16, 2017) (final 
order). 
 333 Id. at 3. 
 334 Id. at 5. 
 335 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settlement Will Ban Fraudulent Marketers from 
Invention Promotion Bus. (May 10, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/05/
ftc-settlement-will-ban-fraudulent-marketers-invention-promotion [https://perma.cc/HXT2-VZ7K]. 
 336 Christine Wang, FBI Reportedly Investigating Company Where Trump’s Acting Attorney Gen-
eral Was an Advisory Board Member, CNBC (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/09/fbi-
reportedly-probing-company-where-matthew-whitaker-was-board-member.html [https://perma.cc/
39CN-RJNB]. 
 337 See discussion supra Part V.B. 
 338 See, e.g., In re Montgomery, No. D2018-02, at 2 (“Approximately, twenty percent (20%) of 
inventions that were submitted for suitability review were recommended by [the Montgomery family 
businesses] for a Research Report; the balance of approximately eighty percent (80%) were deter-
mined not to be suitable.”). 
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sent a subset of ways in which practitioners may commit misconduct in connec-
tion with their USPTO practice. In particular, there are very few disciplinary or-
ders that involve practitioners who overreach in connection with their work, 
whether fraudulent (for example, filing a fraudulent specimen or falsely claiming 
that a trademark is being used in commerce) or misleading (for example, failing 
to disclose information material to patentability).339 Although these types of mis-
conduct are somewhat harder to detect, they are arguably even more dangerous 
given that an incorrectly issued patent or registered trademark can have an im-
pact that extends beyond the practitioner-client relationship to investors, compet-
itors, and the public at large.340 Moreover, the USPTO has recognized the im-
portance of regulating such misconduct by adopting regulations that require a 
stricter level of practitioner candor than the ABA Rules.341 
VI. THE PATH TOWARD USPTO DISCIPLINARY REFORM 
As Part V illustrates, USPTO discipline is underutilized as a tool to regu-
late practitioner conduct and promote good faith in the prosecution of patent 
and trademark applications. Practitioner discipline rates are far below those 
found in state counterparts, particularly when accounting for the high percent-
age of USPTO reciprocal discipline cases. The OED’s sanctioning practice, 
although in some respects more punitive than its state counterparts, is aimed at 
promoting specific deterrence rather than general deterrence, thereby limiting 
its broader impact on the USPTO practitioner population. The actions that be-
come the subject of discipline are largely not unique to the USPTO and are 
easy to identify. The types of misconduct before the USPTO that are more like-
ly to have an effect on the broader public interest, however, are less likely to be 
subject to discipline. 
Even if the lower disciplinary rates for USPTO practitioners are some-
what related to the nature of their work, the significant disparities between pa-
tent and trademark practitioners suggest that even though they are considered 
equals by the OED in theory, they are in fact receiving disparate focus and 
treatment. Patent practitioners are more likely to receive public discipline and 
receive more punitive sanctions, despite the fact that fewer rule violations are 
being cited in their disciplinary orders. 
                                                                                                                           
 339 But see In re Swyers, No. D2016-20, at 1 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Jan. 26, 2017) 
(final order) (finding exclusion by consent where trademark lawyer allowed the filing of multiple 
fraudulent specimens by non-lawyer employees). Swyers is the only trademark attorney who was 
disciplined on this basis, notable in its own right. See id. 
 340 See discussion supra Introduction; Iancu, Remarks at International Trademark Association, 
supra note 8. 
 341 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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This Part responds to these weighty empirical findings, providing three 
recommendations that aim to improve the USPTO disciplinary system. Alt-
hough these recommendations may be implemented in tandem in a synergistic 
fashion, each should have a positive effect. In developing these recommenda-
tions, special attention has been paid to regulating misconduct that currently 
slips through the cracks because there is neither a mechanism to detect it nor 
an entity (such as an adversary) that would naturally report it. 
A. Recommendation 1: Trademark Attorney Registration 
As discussed in Part II.B, trademark attorneys are not subject to separate 
substantive admissions requirements to practice before the USPTO; they only 
need to be an active member in good standing of any state bar. Nor is there an 
admissions process or registration like that which exists for patent practition-
ers; the USPTO first learns that an attorney is prosecuting trademarks when 
she files her first application on behalf of a client and provides her name and 
contact information. 
The lack of a trademark attorney registration system greatly impacts the 
OED’s ability to regulate trademark attorneys. First, it makes it extremely dif-
ficult for the USPTO (and thereby the OED) to have an accurate picture of a 
trademark attorney’s prosecution history. Currently the USPTO would have to 
construct this history using the information provided on trademark application 
forms.342 But these forms require an attorney to provide little information and 
have no quality control checks in place. For example, an attorney might in-
clude a middle name on one application and not another, accidentally misspell 
part of their name, or legally change their name between filings. Unless a 
trademark attorney is extremely vigilant and detail-oriented, it is unlikely that 
the USPTO has a complete record of that attorney’s trademark filings. If each 
trademark attorney had a uniquely assigned registration number, similar to pa-
tent practitioners, the OED could more easily track and monitor their work. 
Second, such a registration system would allow the OED to easily identi-
fy and track those dual practitioners, i.e. those who are prosecuting both pa-
tents and trademarks. This would have at least two benefits. First, the addition-
al detail could aid the OED’s searches for practitioners who are neglecting 
multiple client matters, because those could involve both practice areas. Sec-
ond, it would lessen the likelihood that a suspended or excluded patent practi-
tioner could continue to prosecute trademark applications. This latter issue is 
                                                                                                                           
 342 The USPTO compiles this data in its research datasets. See Trademark Case Files Dataset, 
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one that seems to occur with some frequency, perhaps because there is less 
formal oversight of trademark attorneys.343 
Third, trademark attorney registration would provide the USPTO a better 
understanding of those who are actively engaged in trademark practice. As dis-
cussed in Part V.A, currently there is no easy way to ascertain the number of 
active trademark practitioners because they may choose to begin or end prac-
tice at any time without notifying the USPTO (and the data itself has a large 
percentage of incorrect or suspect attorney names). Were there a trademark 
attorney register, the OED could send inquiries to registered trademark attor-
neys about their practice as it currently does for patent practitioners and re-
move those who no longer intend to practice.344 Having a register would also 
significantly streamline the imposition of reciprocal discipline that appears to 
be more regularly imposed for patent practitioners than their trademark coun-
terparts.345 
Fourth, maintaining a trademark practitioner registry would provide the 
USPTO with a way to communicate with those practitioners who are subject to 
its regulation. This communication channel could be used to provide infor-
mation of interest about emerging issues that implicate the USPTO Rules.346 
Further, it could reinforce the notion that the OED is paying attention to 
trademark attorneys and that they should conduct themselves accordingly. 
Although any registration system is not without cost, a trademark attorney 
registration need not be as comprehensive or costly as the current patent practi-
tioner registration system that has been maintained—seemingly without de-
bate—for decades. In terms of the substantive admission requirements, the 
USPTO could continue its practice of permitting any actively licensed attorney 
to prosecute trademarks. At most, an attorney applicant would have to prove 
the fact of an active admission in good standing (thereby avoiding unauthor-
ized practice issues from the outset), provide basic contact information, and 
then be assigned a unique registration number. Trademark attorneys could then 
                                                                                                                           
 343 See, e.g., In re Frayne, No. D2016-09, at 4–5 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office June 17, 
2016) (initial decision on default) (excluding practitioner who continued to represent trademark appli-
cants and registrants before the USPTO while suspended from practice). 
 344 See Patent Practitioner Search, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://oedci.uspto.gov/
OEDCI/practitionerSearchEntry [https://perma.cc/6WWR-EMTC]. 
 345 Of the 184 reciprocal discipline cases, 139 (75%) involve patent practitioners, 43 (23%) in-
volve trademark practitioners, and 2 (1%) involve dual practitioners. The dual practitioners statistic is 
low in part because there is no easy way to determine whether some of the disciplined patent practi-
tioners also prosecute trademarks. 
 346 Such notices could include the new USPTO Pilot Program for reporting improper trademark 
specimens. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, TM Specimen Protests Email Pilot 
Program (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Specimen%20Protests
%20Email%20Pilot%20Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/MER2-22WD]. 
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incur an ongoing duty to update their information and to notify the OED if 
there is a change in their state bar status. 
B. Recommendation 2: Strategic USPTO Practitioner  
Audits with Examiner Input 
Along with the multitude of benefits that a trademark practitioner regis-
tration system could provide, the USPTO could also benefit from instituting a 
strategic practitioner audit program (PAP). This idea is not entirely novel. In 
2017, the USPTO instituted the Post-Registration Proof of Audit Program (Use 
Audit Program) to tackle the issue of so-called “trademark dead wood,” that is, 
existing registrations that no longer reflect the classes of goods and services in 
which the trademark is being used in commerce.347 Its initial pilot program was 
quite successful, with over half of the randomly audited registrations contain-
ing registrations that could not be substantiated.348 
The USPTO should experiment with a different type of audit—one that fo-
cuses on practitioners rather than their work. Even though both patent and 
trademark applications receive examiner review, they concentrate on whether the 
application under consideration meets the relevant formal and substantive re-
quirements.349 By contrast, a practitioner audit would review all of the practi-
tioner’s filings and other interactions with and representations to the USPTO to 
determine the propriety of their conduct. The validity of the underlying intellec-
tual property would be a secondary factor of this type of PAP and it is quite like-
ly that audits would be triggered by a practitioner’s unsuccessful applications. 
Although the PAP could randomly select its targets, experience suggests 
that such audits would be more effective if they were conducted strategically—
similar to a tax audit.350 Among the criteria that could be considered in deter-
                                                                                                                           
 347 Post Registration Proof of Use Audit Program, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://
www.uspto.gov/trademarks-maintaining-trademark-registration/post-registration-audit-program [https://
perma.cc/96Q6-ZCSQ]; see Emily Kappers & Howard Michael, Cutting the Dead Wood: The 
USPTO’s Post-Registration Trademark Use Audit Program, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/cutting-dead-wood-uspto-s-post-registration-trademark-use-
audit-program [https://perma.cc/6QRZ-X2CZ] (touting the success of the pilot program and discuss-
ing the full rollout). 
 348 See Kappers & Michael, supra note 347. 
 349 See SUE A. PURVIS, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE ROLE OF THE PATENT EXAM-
INER 8–9 (2013), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/offices/ous/04082013_StonyBrookU.
pdf [https://perma.cc/22HV-3MKG] (describing the role of the patent examiner as requiring the exam-
iner to “[i]ssue [v]alid [p]atents” and to “[a]ct as an advocate for the [p]ublic” in ensuring that patents 
are only issued in accordance with the law). 
 350 See IRS Audits, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-
self-employed/irs-audits [https://perma.cc/LR72-YJ25] (“[S]ometimes returns are selected based sole-
ly on a statistical formula. We compare your tax return against ‘norms’ for similar returns. We devel-
op these ‘norms’ from audits of a statistically valid random sample of returns, as part of the National 
 
2020] An Empirical Study of Patent and Trademark Discipline 1681 
mining which practitioners to audit would be those having a relatively high 
percentage of denied applications. Though this fact is not dispositive of mis-
conduct, this may be an indication that a practitioner is either intentionally or 
recklessly overreaching in their work. Over time, additional audit criteria could 
be identified and eventually an algorithm could be developed to pinpoint sus-
pect activities with precision.351 
But the first line of defense against practitioner misconduct is already in 
place. In the course of their daily work, patent and trademark examiners are 
reviewing numerous applications and responses filed by practitioners. Not eve-
ry examination denial (or even the vast majority) will indicate potential practi-
tioner misconduct, but denials could help examiners identity practitioners who 
should be subject to the PAP or, in more egregious cases, make a direct referral 
to the OED. Although the frequency of these direct referrals is not publicly 
known, the overwhelming majority of disciplinary actions appears to have 
originated from identifiable financial misconduct or from neglect that later be-
came apparent to a client.352 
Instituting the PAP will come at a cost. An audit process must be identified 
and executed, requiring auditors to extensively review practitioner conduct and 
engage with audited practitioners. In addition, it will likely lead to additional 
OED investigations and formal processes. These expenses, however, are justified 
if it is assumed that the USPTO should be increasing the frequency of its disci-
pline. Further, the PAP could be streamlined over to defray some of these costs. 
The USPTO could facilitate greater information sharing between the examiners 
and auditors, which should theoretically decrease the auditors’ work. Audited 
practitioners would also be required to respond to a series of questions (similar 
to an RFI), which would then guide the rest of the audit. 
As with the first recommendation, the PAP could provide a number of 
secondary benefits as well. First, the audits could reveal fraudulent or other-
wise ineligible patents or trademarks. The revelation of fraud is in and of itself 
a concern worth addressing, but this could also tackle rising concerns about 
                                                                                                                           
Research Program the IRS conducts. The IRS uses this program to update return selection infor-
mation.”). In spite of decreases in IRS personnel, the threat of a tax audit is heavily discussed and tied 
to particular categories of reported activities. See Thomas Heath, Your Chances of an IRS Audit Are 
Way Down. But Keep It on the Up and Up., WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2018), https://wapo.st/3bhkkq2 
[https://perma.cc/8S8U-5RRG]. 
 351 Cf. Ting Sun & Miklos A. Vasarhelyi, Deep Learning and the Future of Auditing, CPA J. 
(June 2017), https://www.cpajournal.com/2017/06/19/deep-learning-future-auditing/ [https://perma.
cc/5VXN-RN3S] (discussing the use of artificial intelligence to improve the effectiveness of auditing 
in the accounting context). 
 352 See discussion supra Part V.C (discussing the common patterns of misconduct). 
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depletion and clutter.353 Second, the PAP could have a deterrent effect on those 
practitioners who are subject to an audit. Even if the audit does not reveal mis-
conduct giving rise to formal discipline, the audit findings could dissuade 
those practitioners from continuing certain practices that could lead to future 
discipline. Third, and perhaps more importantly, the potential of being subject 
to an audit could have a general deterrent effect on high volume practitioners 
who might otherwise be susceptible to committing misconduct in the face of a 
growing docket and demanding clients.354 
C. Recommendation 3: Broader Dissemination  
of OED Disciplinary Function 
There is existing literature on the advantages of ensuring that the work of 
a state disciplinary authority is adequately publicized to practitioners and 
members of the general public.355 Information about disciplinary actions can 
increase practitioners’ knowledge about the types of misconduct that they 
should guard against.356 The public dissemination of practitioner discipline 
also has an expressive component as well, signaling to practitioners that the 
                                                                                                                           
 353 See Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical 
Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 1041 (2018) (concluding that 
trademark depletion and congestion is a real concern, despite popular belief to the contrary). 
 354 Cf. Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 VA. TAX 
REV. 1, 21–23 (2010) (discussing the deterrent effect of publicizing criminal tax convictions and the 
threat of tax audit). The deterrent effect of tax audits is discussed in the tax literature. See, e.g., Susan 
Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 64 (2009). One 
article notes: 
Most studies show that the [general deterrence] effect of audits overwhelms the direct 
revenue effect. One recent study estimates the general deterrence effect is over ten 
times the direct revenue effect, and that a doubling of audit funding at the federal level 
would increase taxes by as much as 60 times the cost of the additional audits. 
Id.  
 355 See Levin, supra note 239, at 2 (identifying the benefits and drawbacks of greater transparen-
cy, and concluding that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks). One author writes:  
Making disciplinary proceedings more available to the public, particularly by ensuring 
access to online records as the digital age requires, advances several goals the ABA has 
set for attorney discipline, including consistency in punishments, attorney awareness of 
wrongful conduct, integrity of the legal profession, protecting and educating the public, 
ensuring effective assistance, and creating competition for clients. 
Desch, supra note 239, at 923 (citations omitted). 
 356 See Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,178, 20,180 (Apr. 3, 2013) (to be codified in scattered parts of 37 C.F.R.) (con-
templating that practitioners would use disciplinary actions, both from the USPTO and other jurisdic-
tions, to inform their understanding of ethical conduct). 
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OED is committed to ensuring that practitioners act in accordance with the 
USPTO Rules.357 
For the general public, broader dissemination of OED discipline can raise 
awareness about the disciplinary process and increase the likelihood that cli-
ents and other affected persons will report complaints to the OED for investi-
gation. Furthermore, it can have a positive impact on the public’s belief that 
the USPTO is operating as an effective gatekeeper for the issuance of patents 
and trademarks.358 
Currently the USPTO does very little to publicize the OED’s disciplinary 
function. The OED section of the website is difficult to navigate and requires 
users to actively look for information on discipline. There is no public infor-
mation on the website about the imposition of warning letters (private disci-
pline), including the number of letters issued or the types of misconduct that 
give rise to such letters.359 Although the OED Reading Room website allows 
users to search for public discipline, users need to understand how disciplinary 
actions are organized in order to perform an effective search. Even then, the 
search returns PDF versions of documents with descriptive labels such as “Fi-
nal Order,” which means that a user has to read the entire document to learn 
the specifics about the practitioner’s misconduct and sanction imposed.360 
Again, there is no compiled information on the public website about the fre-
quency of public discipline or the types of misconduct that may lead to public 
discipline. 
This Article suggests a variety of measures that could increase the visibility 
and understanding of USPTO discipline, which vary in terms of the administra-
tive time required. First, the USPTO website could be redesigned so that disci-
pline would be featured more prominently. A few simple changes to the site ar-
chitecture and menu would enable website users to quickly find information 
about the OED’s disciplinary function and ways that aggrieved persons can pro-
vide relevant material to the OED so that it can begin an investigation.361 
                                                                                                                           
 357 See generally Mark J. Fucile, Public Discipline Is More “Public” Than Ever: The Impact of 
Web-Based Lawyer Rating Services on Discipline, 24 PROF. LAW. 1 (2016) (discussing the impact of 
publicity of attorney discipline on lawyer conduct). 
 358 Cf. Carpenter & Cluderay, supra note 241, at 739–40 (discussing the public benefit to in-
creased transparency of attorney disciplinary proceedings). 
 359 The USPTO presents selected statistics at its Patent Law Institute but the files and data are not 
posted consistently on the USPTO website. See generally USPTO Presentation, supra note 146. 
 360 See FOIA Documents, supra note 163. 
 361 For an example of a well-designed and comprehensive site, see Lawyer Discipline, N.C. ST. 
BAR, https://www.ncbar.gov/lawyer-discipline/ [https://perma.cc/4MLC-E3TA]. From the main page, 
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Second, the USPTO website could include pages related to the discipli-
nary process and data on the imposition of private and public discipline. Even 
though the specific contents of warning letters should remain private, there is 
an opportunity to share redacted information on these troubling actions that 
could, if repeated, lead to the imposition of public discipline.362 
Third, the USPTO website could include clear and easily accessible in-
formation about the imposition of public discipline for specific practitioners. 
Instead of requiring interested persons to read through numerous (and often 
lengthy) documents to glean an understanding of USPTO public discipline, the 
USPTO could produce short summaries of these actions and publish them on 
the website.363 Although some of the Official Gazette notices include such in-
formation, they are not written at a consistent level of detail and are not com-
piled together in one location for reference or review. 
Fourth, the USPTO could develop a series of formal ethics opinions. 
These types of opinions are frequently published by state disciplinary authori-
ties and enable the authority to communicate definitive guidance on frequently 
encountered or emerging issues.364 At their best, these formal opinions can 
guide practitioner conduct so that they do not become the subject of an investi-
gation. If not complied with, the formal ethics opinions can aptly demonstrate 
that a practitioner committed misconduct.365 
With regard to the costs associated with the foregoing suggestions, the 
first three would take little administrative time and expense. The USPTO com-
piles much of this information for other purposes already, and thus the addi-
tional time would be for altering the website architecture, creating a modest 
amount of web-friendly content, and then making regular updates.366 Though 
formal ethics opinions would take significantly more time to craft and publish, 
they could have considerably greater deterrent value—particularly given the 
low number of formal disciplinary decisions that have been published since the 
2013 adoption of the USPTO Rules. Indeed, the USPTO had contemplated that 
                                                                                                                           
 362 See, e.g., OFFICE OF COUNSEL, N.C. STATE BAR, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 5–12 (2019), https://
www.ncbar.gov/media/730494/2018-counsel-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/98KQ-EQGD] (provid-
ing a comprehensive report of activities of the Office of Counsel, including summaries of major disci-
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 366 See generally USPTO Presentation, supra note 146.  
2020] An Empirical Study of Patent and Trademark Discipline 1685 
practitioners would be able to increasingly use disciplinary decisions to guide 
their conduct, a circumstance that has not come to fruition.367 
CONCLUSION 
Over the last several decades, the USPTO has come to recognize the criti-
cal role that practitioners play in the provision and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. They serve as trusted technical and legal intermediaries be-
tween applicants and the USPTO—simultaneously expected to advocate for 
their clients and act in good faith by fully disclosing information that could 
potentially damage their clients’ chances of success. It is for these reasons that 
the USPTO has invested significant energy in professionalizing the practitioner 
ranks, both for admissions and discipline. The OED has considerable infra-
structure and processes already in place. Without knowing more, one might 
assume that the OED is likewise acting in a manner similar to other state disci-
plinary authorities in regulating practitioners. 
Yet as the results of this original empirical study have demonstrated, the 
OED has failed to fully leverage its disciplinary authority, particularly in its 
regulation of trademark attorneys. Overall, practitioner discipline rates are less 
than one-fourth of that which is imposed by state authorities, and nearly half of 
the OED’s cases involve the imposition of reciprocal discipline imposed by 
another state. Furthermore, trademark discipline comprises less than one-
quarter of all OED cases, and trademark attorneys generally receive less puni-
tive sanctions than do patent practitioners despite violating more ethics rules 
on average. This disparity between patent- and trademark-related discipline 
may not be all that surprising, however, given the differences in how the 
USPTO regulates these two groups of professionals. 
Over the sixteen-year period under study, USPTO discipline was used 
primarily as a tool to regulate individual practitioners who have committed 
easily detected types of misconduct. Three of the four common patterns of 
misconduct that were identified and described—the financial fool, overcom-
mitted practitioner, and absent advocate—are not unique to patent practice and 
do not relate to the central place that the duties of candor and good faith occu-
py in the USPTO’s regulatory purpose. 
With fraudulent and suspicious activity before the USPTO on the rise, it 
is now time for the OED to use its disciplinary authority to more effectively 
serve the public interest. With the adoption of the newest version of the 
USPTO Rules, there is already a regulatory mechanism in place to sanction 
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these types of misconduct. But this mechanism has largely gone unused and its 
workings are largely unknown, even to those who are subject to it. 
The three recommendations provided in this Article present a first step 
towards strategically leveraging the threat of practitioner discipline to promote 
more ethical conduct before the USPTO. Rather than being conceived as dra-
conian measures, however, these recommendations reinforce the notion that 
USPTO practitioners are entrusted to act responsibly and in good faith—not 
only in relation to their individual clients, but also in their entire practice be-
fore the USPTO. 
This Article also has provided a blueprint for how to conduct empirical 
studies of practitioner/attorney discipline, which can be emulated for other dis-
ciplinary authorities so that they may better understand and improve their 
work. In conducting the background research in preparation for this study, the 
author was surprised that there is very little scholarly work on the subject. Ad-
ditional studies would enable disciplinary authorities to identify best practices 
and to align their work in accordance with their mission and the purposes of 
discipline that they wish to prioritize and promote, as was done for the USPTO 
in this Article. 
